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18 June 1963

THE SOVIET BLOC ARMED FORCES
AND THE CUBAN CRISIS

A CHRONOLOGY: JULY - NOVEMBER 1962

NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER
Washington, D. C.

Approved for Release
Date 15 FEB 1995

INTRODUCTION

Recipients of this document are cautioned that it contains some information from very sensitive and restricted sources and that it should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis. It cannot be shown to foreign nationals or disseminated outside the Continental United States.

This chronology of Soviet and other Bloc activity during the period of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba and the period of the Cuban crisis of the summer and fall of 1962 is designed to serve the following purposes: (a) to provide in readily usable chronological order a summary of the known activity undertaken by the USSR in Cuba and concurrently in other areas, and particularly the activity of the Soviet Bloc armed forces during the period; (b) to highlight, by placing the known developments in time sequence in relation with one another, those periods of Soviet military activity which appear to have been most significant in bringing the Soviet military forces to a state of readiness and which may therefore be the most productive for further collection and research for warning purposes; and (c) to serve as a detailed supplement for an accompanying document which will discuss the more significant aspects of Soviet military activities during this period from the standpoint of their possible indications and warning significance.

This study is of necessity a preliminary compilation of the material; it is based largely, particularly with regard to Soviet military activity, on the information reported currently during the period. Such additional information as was received up to early June 1963 has been included, but to date relatively little additional information has been obtained and there has been little further detailed study or reanalysis of Soviet preparedness measures, particularly during the period prior to 22 October. It is hoped that this compilation will be useful in encouraging such collection and research, since it appears almost certain that further information and analysis will provide additional insight into Soviet military planning, doctrine, alerting procedures and deception measures for possible hostilities.

All crises in which the USSR is or may potentially become involved are of value for the study of indications and warning intelligence. There have been a number of these since World War II, all of which provide some insight into the manner in which the USSR alerts or prepares its military forces. There have been only two, however, which were so serious as to involve an actual or potential commitment of Soviet forces in hostilities (except for the Soviet air participation in the Korean War). The first was the Polish-Hungarian crisis of October-November 1956, which involved a sudden and unplanned commitment of Soviet ground forces in Hungary (under lax security conditions) and preparations for such action against Poland; the second was the Cuban crisis. The latter was potentially the more serious, since it involved a risk of direct hostilities between Soviet and US forces (at least in Cuba) and thus a far greater danger of escalation. It is also significantly different in that the USSR had ample time to prepare its forces for the crisis so that it would not be caught by surprise, and to insure maximum secrecy and deception measures.

Even this preliminary compilation of available evidence strongly points to the month of September as of at least equal and possibly greater significance for warning analysis than the period of the "crisis" itself. In particular, the period of approximately 8-20 September, which coincided with the first deliveries of MRBMs to Cuba and the Soviet announcement that its forces were being brought to "highest combat readiness," is believed the most likely (as further information becomes available) to provide understanding of the nature of Soviet preparedness measures.



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This chronology covers the period from 1 July 1962 to 23 November 1962. The initial date was selected because it marked the start of the heavy Soviet military shipments to Cuba. However, Soviet preparations of course began considerably earlier, and the decision to undertake the Cuban venture almost certainly had been made by April. Therefore, certain earlier activity is probably relevant to the buildup although it has not been included here.

Since this study is directed to Soviet and secondarily Satellite preparedness measures rather than to Cuba itself, the developments relating to Cuba have been relatively briefly noted, with the exception of the 22-31 October period when considerably more detail has been included.

Because all US and many other Western intelligence collection facilities were on an alert and every scrap of available information was promptly reported during the period beginning 22 October, the volume of material included for this period on the preparedness measures of the Bloc armed forces is almost certainly disproportionately large in relation to the earlier period. Had a similar intelligence alert been in effect earlier, it is possible that more information would have been currently available.

Items dealing with the USSR and Satellites were selected generally to include: significant training activity, unusual inactivity, or movements of military forces; reports or indications of possible alerts or other unusual readiness measures; unusual security measures or travel restrictions; communications abnormalities, including those which are unexplained; movements of key Soviet military personnel; Soviet diplomatic and political activity, particularly in relation to Berlin and Germany; diplomatic and military activity in other areas possibly intended for diversionary or cover purposes; political deception measures; propaganda particularly that relating to Cuba and Berlin; Soviet press statements relating to readiness measures and deterrent capabilities of the Soviet armed forces; civilian activity where it appeared to bear some possible relation to the problem, such as movements of key civilian leaders and civil defense; and generally any other items which appeared unusual, possibly relevant or of unexplained significance. Where there is doubt, items have been included rather than omitted. Therefore, inclusion of an item does not necessarily constitute a judgment that it bore any specific relation to the crisis or to increased readiness of Bloc forces. Indeed, many military activities noted probably did constitute relatively "normal" training and would have occurred in any case.

All items are entered under the date on which the action occurred, rather than when it was reported. In most cases, the information was obtained relatively promptly after the event, but in some cases there was a considerable delay. In a few instances in which the information was obtained long after the event, this has been noted. In addition, the dating of a number of items relating to the deliveries to Cuba has been based primarily on a restudy of available material after the crisis rather than on current reporting. Thus, the information reported for any date or period in this study is actually more than was available at the time. A few items which cannot be specifically dated have been included at the end of the chronology.

This document has been compiled entirely by the National Indications Center and has not been coordinated with other agencies. Items have been checked for accuracy against current reporting and publications, but there is a possibility that certain items have been

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In addition to material compiled from current reporting during the period, the following have been of particular value:

A compilation of Soviet press comment on military readiness in the Cuban crisis (1 September - 25 November), prepared by the Foreign Documents Division, Central Intelligence Agency, and published in "Soviet Military Report #10," 8 February 1963.

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Collateral reports are generally from reliable or eye-witness sources; in cases where the source is of uncertain or dubious reliability, the nature of the source has usually been indicated. A few items, particularly relating to some US actions, have been taken from press sources and are so indicated.

(1 September - 25 November), prepared by the Foreign Documents Division, Central Intelligence Agency, and published in "Soviet Military Report #10," 8 February 1963.




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JULY 1962: DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA

- 2 Jul: Raul Castro arrived in Moscow and was met by Malinovskiy; composition of his group strongly suggested its purpose was to negotiate for more Soviet military aid. He departed 17 July, after having seen Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders; the lack of a communique suggested possible difficulties during the talks. There were rumors that the purpose of the trip was to secure a defense treaty with the Soviet Union.
- 2 Jul: Photography in the port of Leningrad showed extensive dockside storage of some of the types of equipment subsequently observed on the decks of Soviet ships en route to Cuba.
- Early Jul: The first of the Soviet cargo and passenger ships for the Cuban buildup were being loaded or prepared for loading.
- 6 Jul: A Soviet-Yugoslav protocol was signed permitting Aeroflot landings in Belgrade on future West African runs (the Aeroflot runs subsequently inaugurated to Cuba initially moved through West Africa).
- c 15 Jul: Soviet cargo ships began moving out of the Black Sea for Cuba with false declarations of their destinations and reported tonnages well below their capacities (a normal indication of military cargoes).
- 16 Jul: A TU-114 made the first trial flight on the Moscow-Havana run, followed on 17 July by an announcement that Cuba and the Soviet Union had signed an agreement establishing a regular Moscow-Havana civil air route.
- 18 Jul: Five Soviet fishing vessels arrived in Havana.
- 26 Jul: The arrival of Soviet passenger ships in Cuba began, with five arriving by 7 August. TASS had announced it was sending technicians and Cuban students who had been training in the Bloc. One of the ships was announced as carrying Soviet agricultural technicians and students. The other four were not publicly announced in any manner and disembarked at least 1,500 passengers at Mariel. If troop-loaded, these four ships could have carried about 8,500 men.
- Jul: A total of 15 Soviet dry cargo ships arrived in Cuba; several unloaded military equipment in late July.
- Jul: The first shipment of cruise missiles and associated equipment probably arrived (later identified as the KENNEL AS-1 missile). The date is not firm and the first shipment may have arrived even earlier.
- Jul: Cubans were evacuated and restricted from areas in the vicinity of Mariel, Bahia Honda, and Santa Lucia; the port area of Banes was evacuated.

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Note on page numbering: In addition to the serial numbering of pages at the bottom and the dates at the top, each page is also identified in the lower right-hand corner as to the date and the area involved, e.g.: (Jul: Bloc - 1); (23 Oct: Cuba - 1), etc.

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- 11 Jul: Khrushchev, in a statement carried by Pravda, attacked McNamara's statements that the balance of forces favored the US; the military balance of power would be determined in the course of war and by its outcome; the US was not justified in trying to apply a "position of strength" policy in dealing with the Soviet Union.
- 12 Jul: A TASS statement on Berlin said that the Western powers were "not displaying an understanding for the need to do away with the vestiges of World War II by signing a German peace treaty." Citing US rejection of Khrushchev's proposals for NATO-Warsaw Pact units in West Berlin, it declared that the Soviet Union, with other peace-loving states, "will have to solve the question of signing a German peace treaty...without the participation of the Western powers." Khrushchev, in a talk with US journalists 13 July, set no time limit and indicated the USSR would continue the talks.
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9-20 Jul: The Western Military Liaison Missions were restricted from almost all of East Germany (nine separate areas), for an apparent two-phase CPX.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

JULY 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (2)

[REDACTED]

17 Jul: Izvestiya stated that the talks on Berlin had reached a "crucial state."

16-20 Jul: Khrushchev, Malinovsky and Admiral Gorskov visited the northern USSR, where Khrushchev inspected the Northern Fleet, observed missile launches from submerged submarines and decorated the crew of a Soviet atomic submarine, according to TASS. (During July, a Soviet Northern Fleet nuclear submarine returned from a "special government mission" involving extended and involved accurate navigation, apparently under ice in northern waters, for which its crew received awards.)

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[REDACTED] the USSR announced that it had given the order to resume nuclear testing.

21-24 Jul: Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Rusk met in Geneva for extended discussions.

23 Jul: The Soviets announced that a large area in the Barents/Kara Seas would be closed 5 August - 20 October and that in August-October, the Northern Fleet with rocket and air forces would hold exercises in the use of various types of modern arms in the area. (an announcement in effect of planned nuclear tests in the area)

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23 Jul: Pravda stated that the "provocative activity" from West Berlin required the "immediate" signing of a peace treaty. The continuing intractability of the Soviet

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23 Jul: Pravda stated that the "provocative activity" from West Berlin required the "immediate" signing of a peace treaty. The continuing intractability of the Soviet position, particularly the requirement for Western troop withdrawal from West Berlin, suggested that Moscow was increasingly pessimistic about achieving a

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

JULY 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (3)

23 Jul: negotiated Berlin settlement and might be considering other means of reaching its objectives.
(Cont'd)

[REDACTED]

25 Jul: The CINC, GSFG, protested to General Freeman on alleged US violations of the air corridors and US helicopter flights over East Berlin, implying that such matters should be dealt with at the CINC rather than the commandant level.

26 Jul: Red Star carried an article indicating that amphibious exercises were in progress in the Odessa Military District or had been completed there.

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27 Jul: Khrushchev left Moscow on an extended working vacation on the Black Sea, returning to Moscow on 18 August, again departing for the Black Sea on 21 August, and returning finally to Moscow on 15 September.

28 Jul: Izvestiya strongly reaffirmed Moscow's intention to sign a peace treaty with East Germany which would "not be a mere formality" and would require the West to deal with the East Germans on the question of access; however, there was no mention of a deadline.

27 Jul - 5 Aug: Turkish couriers were denied transit of Batumi and Leninakan on the grounds that transport was sold out. Western attaches were denied visits to Sevastopol for Soviet Navy Day (29 July).

30 Jul: The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Rostov-on-Don was quarantined to all visitors until 1 September for unexplained health reasons, and In-tourist indicated the restriction had already been in effect for two or three weeks. The closure at the time was believed related to the apparent serious riot in the Rostov-Novocherkassk area about 1 June.

Late Jul: Observations indicated that there had been a change of the Soviet vehicle registration numbering system in the USSR, Hungary and Poland, but not in GSFG.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

JULY 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (4)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

31 Jul: USAREUR reported that ECM equipment had been installed at Heinersdorf and Treptow towers in East Berlin (Mound Brick, Cheese Brick, Dome Brick) which could interfere with corridor traffic.

[REDACTED]

Jul: In Indonesia, preparations continued for an attack on West New Guinea, with indications that newly arrived Soviet equipment manned by Soviet crews

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There were reports also that the recently arrived TU-16s, manned by Soviet crews, would be used in the attack. Mikoyan arrived in Indonesia on 20 July and reportedly stated that the Dutch would be eliminated from New Guinea only by force. An Indonesian general reportedly stated that an attack might require the active participation of Soviet personnel. Both Mikoyan and Vershinin allegedly had urged a military solution and had offered Soviet "volunteers."

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AUGUST 1962: DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA

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Various other security measures were imposed, including, in mid-August, the construction of a concrete wall with sentry boxes around the docks at Mariel, the most secure of the Cuban ports.

Early Soviet personnel and ground equipment were unloaded at Mariel and Bahía Honda; the movement of Soviet troop convoys and equipment was reported in the area of Santiago de las Vegas and a number of other points on the island.

4 Aug: A Soviet-Cuban technical assistance agreement for fisheries was signed.

5 Aug: Photography showed a number of vehicles at Matanzas and Santa Lucía, later identified as SAM site areas.

Early Missiles for the cruise missile units probably arrived, representing one of the earliest portions of the buildup (some probably arrived in July).

Second week of The first Komar-class missile patrol boats were observed as deck cargo being delivered to Cuba; they were offloaded at Mariel, 12, 17 and 20 August.

13 Aug: The new Soviet Ambassador (Aleksandr Alekseyev) arrived in Havana, two months after the announcement of his appointment and the departure of the previous Soviet Ambassador.

Mid-Aug: Equipment for the SAM system probably began arriving.

[REDACTED]

Mid to Equipment for the construction of the MRBM and IRBM sites probably arrived.
late Aug: Deployment probably began on the major elements of the Soviet military system.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

AUGUST 1962: DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA (2)

- 28 Aug: A Havana radio broadcast warned that the US would have to answer to the USSR for any aggression against Cuba which would mean another world war.
- 29 Aug: Photography of a Soviet ship approaching Cuba provided the first evidence of the delivery of MiG-21s; a second ship carrying these aircraft was detected 4 September.
- 29 Aug: The first sighting of a Komarov at sea was made in the vicinity of Mariel.
- 29 Aug: The first firm photographic evidence of SAM deployment was collected, when SA-2 equipment was observed being emplaced at seven sites in western Cuba, including SAM radars and launchers (sites were Bahia Honda, Havana, La Coloma, Mariel, Matanzas, San Julian and Cienfuegos).
- 29 Aug: Photographic evidence provided no indication of armored encampments at Artemisa, Santiago de las Vegas or Holguin (or at Remedios on 5 September), indicating the actual establishment of these camps at a later date.
- 29 Aug: Photography of the San Cristobal area revealed no evidence that construction of MRBM sites had yet begun, placing the probable initiation of this activity in early September. However, farmers were evicted from the area of one of the San Cristobal sites in late August and presumably from the locations of the other MRBM sites at about the same time.
- Late Aug: Reports suggest some form of construction activity was under way in the Sagua la Grande area, although photography of 5 September revealed no discernible activity at the location of the MRBM sites.
- 29 Aug: Photography revealed vehicles and building materials later determined to be connected with the construction support area for the Guanajay IRBM site #1; no other work on IRBM sites had apparently begun, since Guanajay #2 and Remedios showed no activity as of 29 August and 5 September respectively.
- 30 Aug: Cuban patrol ships fired on a US Navy patrol plane over international waters.
- [REDACTED]

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Early Aug: Soviet personnel and ground equipment were unloaded at Mariel and Bahia Honda; the movement of Soviet troop convoys and equipment was reported in the area of Santiago de las Vegas and a number of other points on the island.

4 Aug: A Soviet-Cuban technical assistance agreement for fisheries was signed.

5 Aug: Photography showed a number of vehicles at Matanzas and Santa Lucia, later identified as SAM site areas.

Early Aug: Missiles for the cruise missile units probably arrived, representing one of the earliest portions of the buildup (some probably arrived in July).

Second week of Aug: The first Komar-class missile patrol boats were observed as deck cargo being delivered to Cuba; they were offloaded at Mariel, 12, 17 and 20 August.

13 Aug: The new Soviet Ambassador (Aleksandr Alekseyev) arrived in Havana, two months after the announcement of his appointment and the departure of the previous Soviet Ambassador.

Mid-Aug: Equipment for the SAM system probably began arriving.

[REDACTED]

Mid to late Aug: Equipment for the construction of the MRBM and IRBM sites probably arrived.

late Aug: Deployment probably began on the major elements of the Soviet military system.

26 Aug: Che Guevara and Emilio Aragonés left for Moscow, allegedly to discuss the installation of a steel plant. They saw Khrushchev and Gromyko at Yalta on 30 August to discuss international issues "agitating both sides" and a strengthening of friendly fraternal relations, according to a press announcement.

[REDACTED]

- 29 Aug: Photography of a Soviet ship approaching Cuba provided the first evidence of the delivery of MIG-21s; a second ship carrying these aircraft was detected 4 September.
- 29 Aug: The first sighting of a Komar at sea was made in the vicinity of Mariel.
- 29 Aug: The first firm photographic evidence of SAM deployment was collected, when SA-2 equipment was observed being emplaced at seven sites in western Cuba, including SAM radars and launchers (sites were Bahia Honda, Havana, La Coloma, Mariel, Matanzas, San Julian and Cienfuegos).
- 29 Aug: Photographic evidence provided no indication of armored encampments at Artemisa, Santiago de las Vegas or Holguin (or at Remedios on 5 September), indicating the actual establishment of these camps at a later date.
- 29 Aug: Photography of the San Cristobal area revealed no evidence that construction of MRBM sites had yet begun, placing the probable initiation of this activity in early September. However, farmers were evicted from the area of one of the San Cristobal sites in late August and presumably from the locations of the other MRBM sites at about the same time.
- Late Aug: Reports suggest some form of construction activity was under way in the Sagua la Grande area, although photography of 5 September revealed no discernible activity at the location of the MRBM sites.
- 29 Aug: Photography revealed vehicles and building materials later determined to be connected with the construction support area for the Guanajay IRBM site #1; no other work on IRBM sites had apparently begun, since Guanajay #2 and Remedios showed no activity as of 29 August and 5 September respectively.
- 30 Aug: Cuban patrol ships fired on a US Navy patrol plane over international waters.
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

AUGUST 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]

- 1 Aug: Ulbricht and Stoph departed for Moscow and remained in the USSR the entire month.
- 1 Aug: Soviet diplomats in Bonn were hinting broadly to the press that they should not take vacations in August or they would miss an "historic event"; all Polish and Czech correspondents were reportedly ordered to stay in Bonn during August and September.
- 1 Aug: The Soviet commandant in Berlin went on two months' leave, designating his Chief of Staff as acting commandant.
- 1 Aug: A top Bulgarian military delegation, headed by the Defense Minister, arrived in Moscow.
- [REDACTED]

- 2 Aug: Kekkonen reportedly stated his visit to the USSR was scheduled for 10-17 October, after Khrushchev's visit to the UN.
- [REDACTED]

- Early Aug: There were a number of indications of increasing East German security preparations in the Berlin area which suggested possible preparations for the East Germans to assume a more active role in Allied access to Berlin.

- 6 Aug: The Moscow press announced that the Moscow-Leningrad highway would be closed to traffic 9-13 September between Torzhok and Leningrad (about 300 miles or two-thirds of the highway); the Soviets informed the Embassy the reason for closure was "some kind of tests."
- [REDACTED]

- 8 Sep: The first of the large hatch ships docked at the port.
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

AUGUST 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (2)

9 Aug: Izvestiya carried a statement of East German First Deputy Premier Stoph that a peace treaty could not be postponed "any" longer.

- 11 Aug: Soviet Navy chief, Admiral Gorshkov, attended the Bulgarian Navy Day celebrations at Varna.
- 11-15 Aug: The Soviets orbited and recovered their twin cosmonauts Popovich and Nikolaev.
- 12-23 Aug: Soviet Chief of Staff, Marshal Zakharov, paid a visit to Finland.
- 13 Aug: The CINC, GSFG, sent a note to General Freeman regarding helicopter flights over East Berlin, stating that the CINCs are the proper channel for dealing with such problems and indicating that the barring of the Soviet Commandant from the US sector of West Berlin was the reason for use of the CINC-level contact.
- [REDACTED]

Mid-Aug: Several blackout and alert exercises were reportedly held in Leninakan; a number of similar exercises reportedly had been held in preceding weeks. Camouflaged underground public shelters were used by the populace.

Mid-Aug: All sources clearly indicated that the Indonesians were poised for an imminent attack on West New Guinea and that Soviet equipment, manned in part by Soviet crews, might be employed in the attack. Only a last-minute agreement with the Dutch, largely negotiated under US auspices, forestalled the assault.

18 Aug: Rumanian leaders were identified back home from vacation in the USSR.

18-21 Aug: Khrushchev returned briefly to Moscow from his extended stay on the Black Sea; departed again on 21 August and returned to Moscow 15 September.

18 Aug: Khrushchev, speaking at the celebration in honor of the Soviet cosmonauts, claimed that the socialist countries had a military superiority over the capitalist

been issued to take all measures to bring the Soviet armed forces to highest combat readiness. A full page of material carried comments on "aggressive US designs against Cuba." Red Star carried a commentary on the 11 September

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AUGUST 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (3)

18 Aug: Khrushchev made no reference to a time limit on negotiations on Berlin; in statements at about the same time the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn explicitly stated that no date had been set for signing a peace treaty, and a Soviet diplomat in New York suggested the USSR might take the Berlin problem to the UN.

19 Aug: Khrushchev told the West German Ambassador he probably would arrive in New York the second half of September, but his plans were not definite.

18-28 Aug: According to a Danish report, increased activity by Soviet officers was noted both day and night at the planned GSFG wartime headquarters at Ruedersdorf.

21 Aug: The Soviets began transporting their personnel to the War Memorial in West Berlin in armored personnel carriers as a result of indignation in West Berlin over the East German youth allowed to bleed to death at the Wall. The US and UK then began police escort of the Soviet armored vehicles.

21 Aug: Marshal Malinovskiy departed Czechoslovakia after a visit of unknown length, probably for an unannounced visit to East Germany. On 28 August, his plane left Berlin for Moscow. (Note: Except for the announcement that Malinovskiy was in Czechoslovakia, his whereabouts during the entire month of August were apparently not divulged in the Soviet press. Grechko served as Acting Defense Minister in early August, indicating that Malinovskiy was away.)

22 Aug: The Soviets announced the abolition of the office of Berlin commandant, effective 23 August; East German General Poppe was appointed commandant of the Com-

[REDACTED]

AUGUST 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (4)

23 Aug: Rumanian Liberation Day ceremonies were attended by Soviet Marshals Chuykov (CinC, Ground Forces), Vershinin (CinC, Air Forces) and Bogramyon (Chief of Rear Services), and by East German Defense Minister Hoffmann -- all allegedly "vacationing" in Rumania.

27 Aug: Gomulka reportedly returned from vacation in the USSR where he was said to have met with Khrushchev and Ulbricht.

[REDACTED]

28 Aug: TASS announced that Khrushchev and Ulbricht had had a long conversation at Yalta in which "important international questions were discussed."

28 Aug: Khrushchev informed U Thant that he definitely would sign a peace treaty with East Germany but mentioned no date. He claimed he had not yet given thought to attending the UN General Assembly, but said he would not hesitate to come or to meet with President Kennedy if the climate is favorable for such a venture.

[REDACTED]

29 Aug: The East German Berlin commandant formally assumed command of all security forces in East Berlin in a move which subordinated them to the East German Army.

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AUGUST 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (5)

[REDACTED]

30 Aug: The acting Chief of Staff, GSFG, threatened retaliatory action against Western military access to Berlin if the Western powers did not cease escorting Soviet vehicles to and from the Soviet War Memorial in West Berlin. However, the Soviets shortly later accepted the prohibition against the use of Friedrichstrasse as a crossing point for their convoys to the memorial. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

31 Aug: A restricted area was imposed in East Germany for the period to 5 September (see September).

31 Aug: Several reports during July and August indicated that the East Germans would take over old age homes, kindergartens, hospitals, etc. in the 5 kilometer strip along the West German border effective 31 August; one report said there would be a "concentration of manpower" in the strip after 1 September, but there was no subsequent indication that the measure was more than continuing improvement of security measures.

[REDACTED]

Late Aug: The Czech press announced that the summer Spartacus games of the Bloc armies, which had been scheduled for 1-9 September to involve large groups of soldiers from other Socialist countries, had been cancelled.

Late Aug: Beginning in late August and continuing through late October, an unusual number of Soviet naval ships (at least 13) transited the Turkish Straits en route to foreign navies for transfer.

Aug: There were rumors which could not be substantiated by attache observations that additional Soviet troops (allegedly up to 18,000) had moved into Poland.

SEPTEMBER 1962: DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA

- 1 Sep: A TASS release from Havana charged the US with "preparing for aggression against Cuba," and claimed that a White House statement confirmed that the warlike policy of the US threatens Cuba and the peace of the world.
- 2 Sep: A joint Cuban-Soviet communique issued on the departure of Che Guevara from Moscow strongly reaffirmed the Soviet "right" to provide Cuba with military equipment and technicians for the training of Cuban military personnel to assist it in withstanding "threats of imperialist aggressive circles"; it stated that an agreement had been reached for the provision of such aid to Cuba. There was no specific commitment to defend Cuba in all contingencies.
- 3 Sep: Pravda carried a photograph of 400 Cubans, dressed in military-type uniforms, arriving in Odessa "for training in the USSR."
- 4 Sep: President Kennedy issued a statement to the press announcing the arrival in Cuba of Soviet surface-to-air missiles, radar equipment, guided missile boats (Komars), coastal defense missiles, and about 3,500 Soviet military technicians. He stated that there was no evidence of any organized combat forces in Cuba from any Soviet Bloc country or of offensive ground-to-ground missiles but that, "were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise." The Castro regime "will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere."

5 Sep: A second group of SAM sites was detected (three) but they appeared to be in the initial stages of construction.

5 Sep: Photography showed no evidence of MRBM site construction at Sagua la Grande (where two MRBM sites were later identified).

5 Sep: MIG-21 crates were unloaded at La Isabela, a third ship carrying MIG-21 crates was identified nearing Cuba, and the first assembled MIG-21 was photographed at Santa Clara.

First week Sep: Cubans were reported evicted from the areas of the San Cristobal MRBM sites #1 and 2. The arrival of the troops of the four armored groups probably began (the information is not precise) and continued into the second week of October.

5-7 Sep: The Soviet press carried additional articles charging the US with preparing to attack Cuba.

7 Sep: President Kennedy asked Congress for authority to call up 150,000 reservists.

7 Sep: Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin assured Ambassador Stevenson in New York that "only defensive weapons are being supplied" to Cuba.

7 Sep: Two unarmed US Navy patrol planes were buzzed over international waters by an aircraft tentatively identified as a MIG-17.

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SEPTEMBER 1962: DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA (2)

- 8 Sep: Pravda noted President Kennedy's message to Congress on the callup of 150,000 reservists to active duty because of the buildup of Communist forces in Cuba and international tensions.
- 8 Sep: The first of the large hatch ships docked at Casilda, probably carrying MRBM equipment for the Sagua la Grande sites; deliveries through this port probably continued for these sites through 17 October, although no reports of unloadings were received.
- 11 Sep: TASS released an authorized Soviet Government statement which said with respect to Cuba: The US is staging provocations which might plunge the world into the disaster of a thermonuclear war. The President's request to call up 150,000 reservists cannot be assessed as other than a screen for aggressive plans and intentions. The US wants to repeat "against little heroic Cuba" what it did once (1917) against the Soviet Union. The USSR, like other socialist countries, has stretched out a hand of assistance to the Cuban people and is supplying industrial equipment and goods; it is sending agronomists, tractor drivers and rank-and-file state and collective farm workers. "A certain amount of armament and some military specialists and technicians to train the Cubans in handling up-to-date weapons are also being sent at the request of the Cuban Government. "However, the number of Soviet military specialists sent to Cuba can in no way be compared to the number of agricultural workers being sent there." The armaments and military equipment are "designed exclusively for defensive purposes." "There is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other country--like Cuba. Our nuclear weapons are so powerful in their explosive force, and the Soviet Union has such powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads, that there is no need to search for sites beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." Further noting that the time has gone forever when the US had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, it notes the terrible consequences of war and states that "one cannot attack Cuba and expect that the aggressor will be free from punishment. If this attack is made, it will be the beginning of the unleashing of war." (See also the Bloc section for portions of this statement dealing with the Soviet military forces and Berlin.)
- 12 Sep: The Cuban Foreign Minister told a Canadian official that the Cubans did not have an ironclad military guarantee from the Soviets. Another report of about the same time indicated that Raul Castro had been turned down in Moscow in early July on his request that Cuba become a member of the Warsaw Pact, and that the same request by Che Guevara was turned down in early September.
- 12 Sep: There was a reported sighting in Havana of trailers carrying missiles answering the description of the SS-4 MRBM. (see 15 September).
- 13 Sep: President Kennedy issued a statement that the US would take necessary measures if the Soviet buildup or a Cuban use of force threatened the security of the US or its allies. "I have indicated that if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive actions against the United States, the United States would act."
- 13 Sep: A Pravda editorial expanded on the 12 September statement.

SEPTEMBER 1962: DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA (3)

- 13 Sep: (Cont'd) exclusively for defensive purposes is being sent to Cuba," citing the capability of the USSR to render help "from its own territory to any peace-loving state," and repeating that an attack would be the beginning of war and that orders had been issued to take all measures to bring the Soviet armed forces to highest combat readiness. A full page of material carried comments on "aggressive US designs against Cuba." Red Star carried a commentary on the 11 September statement, which said that the arms to Cuba were "exclusively for defensive purposes" and denied any Soviet need to install atomic missiles outside Soviet borders. It said that the USSR "will never permit American imperialists to extinguish the Cuban revolution either by blockade or by military intervention."
- 15 Sep: The Poltava, a large hatch ship, docked at Mariel, probably carrying MRBM equipment for the San Cristobal sites; sources reported the probable unloading of MRBMs at that port during the three nights preceding 17 September and the night movement of a convoy of at least eight MRBMs through towns between Mariel and San Cristobal during the night of 17-18 September. (By 19 October, all missiles for the San Cristobal sites had probably arrived in Cuba through the Havana-Mariel area. See 12 September for a possible delivery of MRBMs through Havana slightly earlier.)
- 15 Sep: The Soviet press carried fragments of President Kennedy's press conference of 13 September and further alleged evidence of "an impending US attack on Cuba"; and additional statements supporting the Soviet Government position were cited.
- Mid-Sep: An intensive Soviet propaganda campaign was under way charging the US with aggressive designs on Cuba and reiterating the theme of the TASS statement of 11 September that Soviet deterrent power is available for use against any aggressors which threaten world peace. The Soviet press was also publishing charges that US military aircraft had buzzed Soviet merchant vessels en route to and from Cuba.
- 16 Sep: A fourth shipment of Komars was offloaded at Mariel.
- 17 Sep: Khrushchev told the Austrian Vice Chancellor that Soviet ships were under orders to ignore any US blockade action against Cuba, adding that firing on such ships would be an act of war.
- 17-20 Sep: Work possibly began on the Guanajay #2 and Remedios IRBM sites (first observed on photography on 15 and 17 October); the date is estimated. So far as is known, no IRBMs were delivered to Cuba.
- 19 Sep: Pravda carried an article by an International law expert stating that a US blockade of Cuba would be aggression and a violation of the UN charter. In case of attack, other countries would be justified in coming to the aid of the "victim of aggression" under terms of the UN charter.
- 20 Sep: The US Senate passed a resolution on Cuba.

- 8 Sep: The first of the large hatch ships docked at Casilda, probably carrying MRBM equipment for the Sagua la Grande sites; deliveries through this port probably continued for these sites through 17 October, although no reports of unloadings were received.
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SEPTEMBER 1962: DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA (4)

- 20 Sep: Soviet Lt. Gen. Pavel Dankevich was first identified in Cuba; he was formerly at Vinnitsa and possibly held the post of commander of the rocket forces in Cuba.
- 21 Sep: Gromyko, in his UN speech, charged the US with whipping up war hysteria and said that President Kennedy had threatened invasion of Cuba in violation of the UN charter. The USSR and socialist countries have "at least" the same means as the capitalist countries. Any US attack on Cuba would have the results mentioned in the Soviet statement of 11 September, that is "the beginning of the unleashing of war."
- 25 Sep: It was announced that a Soviet-Cuban agreement had been concluded for the construction of a large fishing port in Cuba for the use of the Soviet Atlantic fishing fleet, under lease to the Soviets. (There was some indication that this was announced prematurely by Cuba without Soviet concurrence.)
- 25 Sep: TASS reported US Congressional approval of the resolution to call 150,000 reservists and to extend the period of active duty.
- 26 Sep: Three more SAM sites were photographed.
- 26 Sep-
10 Oct: Four Soviet ships were observed carrying a total of 62 cruise missiles to Cuba (this probably brought the total of Soviet cruise missiles in Cuba to at least 116, as later identified in photography). The cruise missile site at Siguanea was first observed and was operational on 29 September.
- 30 Sep: The first IL-28s identified from photography of the crates at sea arrived in Cuba on the Kasimov (other ships carrying IL-28s were photographed during October).
- Sep: A total of 50 Soviet cargo ships arrived in Cuba, the peak for any month; however, it would have been exceeded in October except for the US quarantine.

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS

- 1 Sep: Western travelers were reportedly told in Moscow that Kharkov and Rostov-on-Don airports were to be wholly or partially used by the military effective 1 September and that no foreigners would be allowed to land in these cities. (Note: see entry of 30 July for a reason given earlier by the Soviets for a cut-off of travel to Rostov.)
- 1 Sep: East German units were inspected by members of the Warsaw Pact high command and Ministry of Defense personnel as part of a series of inspections, according to an East German regimental commander who defected 8 September; emphasis was placed on speeding up unit training, particularly in heavy equipment.
- 2 Sep: Italian travelers observed three westbound trains carrying medium tanks, at least 1,000 Soviet soldiers and 20-30 closed van trucks during a train trip from Warsaw to Brest.
- 3 Sep: A USMLM vehicle was fired on by a Soviet train guard near Frankfurt/Oder while the MLM team was observing a train apparently carrying missile-associated equipment.
- 3 Sep: TASS announced that Khrushchev had recently visited Krasnodar Krai (Kuban) during his vacation.
- 4 Sep: The USSR protested to the US that a U-2 aircraft had violated Soviet territory on 30 August, spending nine minutes over Soviet territory near Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk; the diplomatic note was accompanied by propaganda charging that the flight was provocative and might have serious consequences. Red Star on 6 September criticized the battle readiness of PVO units.
- 4 Sep: The Soviets discontinued movement of their War Memorial guards through the

- 21 Sep: Gromyko, in his UN speech, charged the US with whipping up war hysteria and said that President Kennedy had threatened invasion of Cuba in violation of the UN charter. The USSR and socialist countries have "at least" the same means as the capitalist countries. Any US attack on Cuba would have the results mentioned in the Soviet statement of 11 September, that is "the beginning of the unleashing of war."
- 25 Sep: It was announced that a Soviet-Cuban agreement had been concluded for the construction of a large fishing port in Cuba for the use of the Soviet Atlantic fishing fleet, under lease to the Soviets. (There was some indication that this was announced prematurely by Cuba without Soviet concurrence.)
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4 Sep: The Soviets discontinued movement of their War Memorial guards through the US sector of West Berlin, switching to the checkpoint at Invalidenstrasse in the British sector.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (2)

2-15 Sep: There was a relative lull in Soviet nuclear testing, with only one test during the period (8 September). It is uncertain whether this is of any significance in relation to the readiness status of Soviet forces. There were other periods of relative lulls in the tests between 27 September and 7 October and 14 and 20 October; no break in testing occurred during late October or early November, although there was another lull period after 4 November.

Early Sep: Some Czech reservists were reportedly "suddenly" recalled to active duty (information is scant and it is not known whether this was an unusual recall of reservists or routine refresher training).

5 Sep: The Soviets delivered notes to the Western powers concerning Berlin, charging

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (3)

6 Sep: Ambassador Dobrynin told Stevenson in New York that Khrushchev would not attend the UN before mid-November, leaving an impression that no decision had been reached but that Khrushchev might come thereafter.

8 Sep: The commander of the East German 2d Motorized Rifle Regiment defected to the West and reported: East German training was to be accelerated this fall and completed by the end of October (one month earlier than usual); his unit was to participate in a Western Bloc maneuver some time between late September and

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Early Sep: Some Czech reservists were reportedly "suddenly" recalled to active duty (information is scant and it is not known whether this was an unusual recall of reservists or routine refresher training).

5 Sep: The Soviets delivered notes to the Western powers concerning Berlin, charging them with various provocations and again calling for the abolition of the occupation of Berlin and withdrawal of Western troops.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (4)

[REDACTED]

8 Sep- Most of the Soviet High Command attended a reception celebrating Soviet Tank
1 Oct: Day the evening of 8 September. From then until 1 October, the following are
the only reported appearances:

9 Sep: Sudets (CinC, PVO) attended the armed forces day celebration in
Bulgaria. He is otherwise unaccounted for during September.

13-14 Zakhorov (Chief of Staff) and Chuykov (CinC, Ground Forces) re-
Sep: ceived the Iraqis and Syrians on their arrival in Moscow.

24-25 Biryuzov (CinC, Strategic Rocket Forces) and Chuykov were at re-
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ently were not identified at all during the month of September. The remainder
of the High Command who attended the Tank Day celebrations made their next
public appearance in October, except as noted above. While it is not unusual
for individual members of the High Command to be unaccounted for in the Soviet
press for periods of time, there does appear to have been a marked absence of
such appearances during September. At least some of them are believed to have
attended the exercise in the Far East.

[REDACTED]

9 Sep: A Chinese Nationalist U-2 was brought down by the Chinese Communists.

[REDACTED]

9-13 A major portion of the Moscow-Leningrad highway (from Torzhok to Leningrad)
Sep: was closed to travel, for unknown reasons (see entry of 6 August for Soviet
announcement), possibly in connection with military exercises. Observations
from the railway 10-11 September showed no traffic on portions of the road
which were visible.

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (5)

- 10 Sep: There were rumors from Rumania that the conscript class due for release in October would be held in service until 1 January.
- 10 Sep: Ulbricht in a television speech declared that an understanding on Berlin was the most important task, warning against delays and stating that a peace treaty will come in any case.
- 11 Sep: The Soviet Government statement on Cuba, released by TASS, stated that the USSR would not follow the lead of the US in calling up reservists, but had in fact just ordered the release of servicemen who had completed their term of service. "This alone is a clear enough indication of our peaceful intentions. No government would take such a measure if it contemplated any action of a military nature." However, in view of US threats, the Soviet Union "must do everything to be prepared, to see to it that our armed forces -- the strategic rocket forces and the ground forces, the anti-aircraft defense, the navy and particularly the submarine fleet -- are able to cope with their tasks. If the aggressor unleashes war, our armed forces must be ready to strike a crushing retaliatory blow against the aggressor.... The Soviet Government considers it its duty to be vigilant in this situation and to instruct the Minister of Defense of the USSR and the command of the Soviet Army to take all measures to bring our armed forces to the highest combat readiness." These, however, "are exclusively precautionary measures." In a concluding section, the statement indicated that "a pause" had been reached in talks on a German peace treaty, and that the Soviet Government was prepared to reckon with the fact that it was difficult for the US to negotiate on the German treaty now since elections are due in November. (See Cuban section for portions of this statement dealing with Cuba.)
- 11 Sep: Khrushchev, in a conversation with Ambassador Kroll of West Germany, indicated he would proceed with the German peace treaty shortly after the US elections; the terms would make continuation of Western occupation of Berlin quite impossible.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (6)

12-18
Sep:

Elements of the Soviet Seventh Guards Army (Yerevan), together with border troops, conducted a demonstration for the benefit of the visiting Arab delegations, involving a mock attack from Turkey and a subsequent counterattack. (The information is from a Border Guard defector; size of the exercise is not known.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (7)

12 Sep: An area in the Gulf of Finland was closed to all ships from 0400 to 1900Z, according to a navigational warning issued by Leningrad on 11 September. No reason was given.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (8)

11-18 A trip of the Canadian MA to Murmansk was postponed by the Soviets from 11 to
Sep: 18 September and he was later informed no tickets were available until 20 Sep-
tember. The closure of the Moscow-Leningrad highway between Torzhok and
Leningrad was believed related to these exercises.

SEPTMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (9)

12-13
Sep:




There were some signs of increased vigilance related to the Berlin situation, including appearance of a Soviet soldier on top of the Brandenburg gate, reconnaissance of the sector/zonal border by four or five helicopters, an alleged direction of EGA soldiers to assembly areas, and an apparent "air of expectancy" on the part of the Soviets as if they expected "something to happen"; these were attributed to the controversy over Soviet use of armored personnel carriers to transport War Memorial guards in West Berlin.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (10)

- 13 Sep: An East German defector reported that effective 13 September leaves were reduced to 15 percent and passes to 10 percent because of the Cuban and Berlin situations. However, this is believed to be normal during the fall maneuver period.
- Sep: All employees and workers of an East German rail station northwest of Berlin were reportedly compelled to sign a "secrecy oath" with regard to military transports during September; whether this was a routine security move or related to some special military movements during September is not known.

[REDACTED]

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (11)

[REDACTED]

- 13 Sep: Red Star carried interviews with "indignant civilians" and reports of "hands-off-Cuba" meetings in the armed forces, said to have been held in GSFG, SGF, the Baltic Fleet and the Odessa Higher Combined-Arms Command School.
- 13 Sep: The USSR announced that its delegation to the UN General Assembly, opening in New York on 18 September, would be led by Foreign Minister Gromyko.
- 14 Sep: A Red Star editorial stated the Soviet armed forces "now more than ever before must be equal to their tasks." The "highest combat readiness" means the highest level of organization, precise execution of orders and instructions, and faultless discipline. "The mighty and awesome Soviet armed forces... are always ready to execute any command of the motherland and destroy any aggressor." The article claimed Soviet possession of nuclear weapons "in adequate quantity and quality" and first-class equipment of every type. The issue carried more protest meetings from the Soviet armed forces and more material on alleged US "aggressive policy" toward Cuba.
- [REDACTED]
- 14 Sep: The Soviets changed back from armored personnel carriers to busses to transport their personnel to the War Memorial in West Berlin, in an apparent move to ease

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SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (12)

Mid-Sep: Various reports and Soviet statements continued to point to Bloc plans to resume moves toward a Berlin settlement in November.

15 Sep: Khrushchev returned to Moscow from the Black Sea.

15-25 East German troops were extensively engaged in harvest activity.

18 Sep: A page one story in Red Star described preparations in a PVO rocket unit prior to going on combat duty, tying these to "US provocations against Cuba" and the highest combat readiness. A joint Soviet-Cuban meeting was held in Odessa, according to a Pravda item of the following day.

17 Sep: Khrushchev took a belligerent line in talks with the Austrian Vice Chancellor, stating that the USSR would use submarines and rockets to enforce its right of passage to Cuba and hinting that US intervention in Cuba would spark Soviet reaction in Berlin. He indicated he was still thinking of going to New York in the second half of November and would hope to see the President. If there

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (13)

- 17 Sep: treaty. There would be no blockade of Berlin but also no access to maintain Western troops there. He expressed confidence there would be no war unless it were triggered by crazy, hot-headed action.
- (Cont'd)
- 17 Sep: A USSR declaration reiterated the position that Western occupation of West Berlin has no legal basis and that recent developments show the "necessity for immediately abolishing the NATO military base in West Berlin."
- 18 Sep: Khrushchev held an interview with former Belgian Economics Minister Scheyven (not published until 21 October) in which Khrushchev said he would bring the German question up at the UN and made reference to a separate peace treaty under which Soviet forces would be introduced into Berlin.
- 19 Sep: A source transitting Leninakan en route to Moscow reportedly saw soldiers digging trenches near the rail line. On the trip, the source observed no apparent marshalling of rolling stock, increased guards on bridges or railroads or any other unusual military or civil defense activity.
- 19 Sep: A Red Star editorial in honor of the anniversary of the October revolution noted the efforts of the armed forces "to storm the heights of military skills" and stated that they must be brought to the highest state of combat readiness in the light of the world situation and US plans for aggression against Cuba. "This compels Soviet military personnel to be on the alert every second." The Soviet press also carried articles stating that the general course of US policy was directed toward the unleashing of a rocket-nuclear war against the socialist countries and describing US aggression against Cuba as a violation of international law which "can lead to catastrophic consequences."
- 19 Sep: Ulbricht endorsed the Soviet declaration that negotiations on Berlin could wait until after the US Congressional elections, expressing hope that the West would take steps during the "pause" to create a favorable atmosphere for negotiations. The speech concluded Ulbricht's visit to Rumania; a joint communique was devoted largely to Berlin and Germany.

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SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (14)

- 20 Sep: Red Star, in an editorial criticizing the Bonn-Paris axis, called for the highest combat readiness of the Soviet armed forces and unremitting vigilance of Soviet servicemen, and carried an article praising the "efficiency and readiness" of rocket troops whose combat capability "must be at the highest."
- 21 Sep: According to a reported memorandum of conversations between Soviet officials and the Cuban Ambassador in Geneva (evaluated C-2), the Soviets stated that "everything is prepared for the possibility of Soviet intervention if the US attacks." There was a mobilization of all Soviet forces (the Cuban Ambassador interpreted this to mean a gathering of strength in all areas rather than a military movement). "All land, sea and air forces" were reported alerted. The USSR had taken a decision to defend Cuba at all costs and the Soviet people were ready.
- 21 Sep: Radio Moscow carried a broadcast in English to Southeast Asia concerning a Red Star article which said again that an order had been issued to bring Soviet forces to "highest combat readiness" but in which the English version of this was given as "war footing." This variant of the Russian phrase "naivysshuyu boyevuyu gotovnost" (highest combat readiness) was not reported in any other Moscow English-language broadcasts, but it could be a reflection of what the Soviets actually mean by this phrase.
- 21 Sep: Red Star carried an editorial titled "The Submarine Fleet is on Combat Watch," which praised the "power and combat capability" of the Soviet submarine fleet which is vigilantly watching the maritime frontiers, fulfilling the government order to be at the highest combat readiness, and ready, if the aggressor forces it, to put to sea immediately and bring down the enemy with rocket strikes and torpedo fire.
- 21 Sep: Red Star carried another article denouncing the so-called 20 September "anti-Cuban" resolution of the US Senate and citing other facts as evidence that the situation in the Caribbean was exceedingly strained, reiterating the necessity for the highest state of vigilance and alertness, and stating that Soviet soldiers are in the highest state of combat readiness to destroy the aggressors. Another article dealt with increased combat readiness and widespread meetings to explain the in-

SEPTMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (15)

- 23 Sep: Red Star carried a report on the state of readiness and training of a radar installation on "day and night" operation. Pravda carried the text of Gromyko's 21 September speech to the UN General Assembly which stated, inter alia, that "an attack on Cuba would lead to consequences of which the Soviet Government warned the entire world in its well-known 11 September 62 statement."
- 24 Sep: The USSR announced the postponement for all but the lower income groups of the scheduled exemption from income taxes because of "premeditated aggravation of international tension...by imperialist forces...threatening universal peace."
- 24 Sep: Soviet President Brezhnev began a visit to Yugoslavia.
- 24 Sep: Two defectors reported that 100 men from two units of the East German Army were sent to Zwickau for four weeks of special training.

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[REDACTED]

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET ALOC DEVELOPMENTS (16)

c 24-27 A Warsaw Pact exercise was conducted in western Czechoslovakia

Sep:

[REDACTED] It culminated with a parade in Karlovy Vary. The exercise was announced by the Czechs on 30 September. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25 Sep: A Soviet lecturer at a public forum in Moscow emphasized that the USSR was making every effort to achieve a peaceful solution of the Berlin problem, but Khrushchev cannot wait much longer. A peace treaty is ready and can be signed within minutes but a negotiated settlement is preferable. He then frankly described the horrors of nuclear war, warning that events in Berlin could spark such a conflict; the Soviets would win but only at a terrible cost.

25 Sep: Red Star carried a report from the North Caucasus Military District concerning "intensive night flights," some of them of long-range. Over 2,000 letters were said to have been received during one week testifying to the efforts of military personnel to bring their units to the highest state of combat readiness.

[REDACTED]

25-26 Soviet fighters harassed a USAF C-47, an Air France Caravelle, and a Pan
Sep: American clipper in the Berlin corridors with close passes; this followed a period of relatively few air incidents.

26 Sep: Khrushchev arrived in Ashkhabad, Turkestan, on the start of a tour of Central Asia.

27 Sep: Red Star carried an editorial on "training alert" which stressed the importance of efficiently conducted training alerts "to every unit and ship of the Soviet armed forces" as a means of developing their ability to mount instantaneous action. An article described the high state of training and vigilance of a tank unit of SGF.

[REDACTED]

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (17)

- 28 Sep: A Red Star editorial described the gunnery of naval rocket carriers which stated that Soviet sailors must "be ready at the first signal to put to sea and deliver a crushing blow against an aggressor."
- 28 Sep: Pravda carried another statement warning that the USSR and its allies would have no option but to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany if the Western powers are not responsive to Soviet proposals.
- [REDACTED]
- 29 Sep: Red Star carried an article titled, "We Are With You, Cuba," consisting of a review of the numerous letters being received by the editors expressing the "readiness of our people and the soldiers of the Soviet armed forces to render the necessary aid to Cuba at any minute."
- 30 Sep: Neues Deutschland carried an editorial on the "pause" in Berlin negotiations, quoting Ulbricht's statement that a "peace treaty is coming in any case" and stating that the Western powers would be "smart" to accelerate the pace of conversations on Berlin. The East Germans will use the remaining time to strengthen East Germany, "for we know that the outcome of negotiations cannot differ fundamentally from power relationships."
- Late Sep: According to a third-hand report said to have originated with employees of electronics and aircraft plants in Leningrad, these plants were operating on a wartime production alert in late September and the atmosphere at the plants was one of impending war. An "increase in international tension" was given as the official explanation for the alert status and all employees were said to have been impressed with the need to make an all-out effort.
- [REDACTED]
- Late Sep: According to an East German Border Command defector, releases were officially postponed from late September to some time in November.
- 7

It culminated with a parade in Karlovy Vary. The exercise was announced by the Czechs on 30 September.

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- 26 Sep: Khrushchev arrived in Ashkhabad, Turkestan, on the start of a tour of Central Asia.
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1-14 OCTOBER 1962: DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA

3 Oct: Pravda carried an article on US policy toward Cuba and the Monroe Doctrine which stated that, "if there are Soviet weapons in Cuba, then they have been sent there in accordance with the will of the Cuban people.... The objectives of Soviet armament and military specialists as aid to Cuba are purely defensive.... The Soviet Government...has warned the American ruling circles through the TASS announcement that it would be now impossible to attack Cuba without punishment."

First week of Oct: Additional SAM sites were identified on photography at Manati, Senado, Manzanillo, Chambas and Esmeralda, bringing the total identified under construction to 18.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

14 Oct: Two more SAM sites were identified in Camaguey Province, bringing the total to 20.

14 Oct: The first of the MRBM sites (San Cristobal #1) possibly had an operational capability.

14 Oct: US aircraft made the photoreconnaissance flights which first detected the MRBM sites.

1-14 OCTOBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS

- 2 Oct: Red Star continued the publication of letters from its readers on the readiness of units and ships in light of the world situation, with an introduction claiming that the US had created a situation in which some incident could "develop into the catastrophe of world thermonuclear war." It reiterated that everything was being done to fulfill the government's requirement that the armed forces be brought to the highest state of combat readiness. An alleged letter said that personnel of an interception unit were always on the alert and ready and that "weapons must always be ready for battle, and doubly so in these days."
- 2 Oct: A Yugoslav official reported he was "about 95 percent sure" that Khrushchev would attend the UN General Assembly in about three weeks.
- 3 and 4 Oct: TASS carried warnings concerning Soviet military retaliatory capabilities in case the US should resort to war over a German peace treaty. Two Soviet officials at the UN indicated on 3 October that the Berlin problem would be solved one way or another by the end of the year.
- 3 Oct: The newly arrived Soviet Ambassador in the Congo reportedly offered military assistance against Katanga if the UN plan failed and the UN was removed from the Congo.
- 3-5 Oct: The East German Party Central Committee held a plenum and announced that the Party Congress would be held in January.
- 3-5 Oct: The East German railways reportedly conducted a communications exercise or CPX involving mobilization procedures (West German report).
- 4 Oct: Soviet President Brezhnev concluded a ten-day visit to Yugoslavia and a communique was issued asserting an identity of views on international questions.

A Warsaw Pact exercise was conducted in northwest Poland

The exercise was announced on 10 October as having closed with a parade in Szczecin 9 October. The exercise was attended by Marshal Grechko (CinC of the Warsaw Pact Forces), the CinC of GSEF and most Satellite Defense Ministers.

- Oct: movement, preparations were underway with various marine units prepared for reinforcement of southern Florida, stationing of four destroyers between Cuba and

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- Early Oct: A Soviet newspaper in the Kirgiz Republic contained the first noted press reference to civil defense drills being organized and implemented in that part of the Soviet Union.
- 5 Oct: Red Star carried a lengthy discussion by officers of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces concerning the combat readiness of troops under modern conditions and readiness doctrine in light of the Cuban situation. It stated, among other things, that the underestimation of the timely placement of armed forces in appropriate combat readiness in the face of a military threat had often been a reason for defeat of particular countries, that the Soviet reverses at the start of the German invasion in 1941 could have been substantially reduced had the troops been deployed in time and prepared to repel the German attack, and that today all branches of the armed forces, and particularly the Strategic Rocket Troops, are required to maintain high combat readiness. It defined "highest combat readiness" as "that state in which troops are able at any moment to repel successfully a surprise nuclear attack of an aggressor and, at the first signal, to undertake resolute combat operations aimed at the complete destruction of the enemy." (See appendix)
- 5 Oct: Red Star carried an editorial on the alert status for PVO rocket troops, referred to as "combat duty."
- 6-8 Oct: Soviet reconnaissance aircraft showed great interest in the movements of the US carrier Kitty Hawk to Japan from Hawaii.
- 7 Oct: On the anniversary of the East German regime and ending of the SED plenum, both Khrushchev and Ulbricht reiterated their desire to settle the Berlin problem through negotiations and to resort to a unilateral solution only if agreement proves impossible. Another report was received that Khrushchev intended to be in New York, this time on 20 November.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1-14 OCTOBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (3)

- 8 Oct: An East German military delegation, headed by Defense Minister Hoffmann, arrived in the USSR for a ten-day visit and was met by Malinavskiy and later by Khrushchev. It was the first official German military visit to the USSR since World War II. Kozlov stated that its experience in the Soviet Union would help in augmenting the protection afforded by the Berlin Wall.
- 9 Oct: A high-level Soviet Party delegation, headed by Demichev, arrived in East Germany, remaining until 21 October.
- 10 Oct: Khrushchev returned to Moscow from an extended tour of Central Asia.
- [REDACTED]
- 10 Oct: A Soviet truck convoy was reportedly observed east of Berlin carrying vehicle registration numbers of the Carpathian Military District (the validity of this observation was never established).
- 10 Oct: Red Star reported a test of combat readiness of rocketeers; in accordance with the "well-known TASS announcement," every soldier and officer was said to be morally prepared for the execution of any mission--"this is the highest combat readiness in action."
- 10 Oct: Gromyko in New York reviewed the standard Soviet line on Berlin to Secretary Rusk, stating that the USSR would deeply regret having to act without the US and its allies.
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[REDACTED]

11 Oct: Soviet BISONs and TU-16s conducted heavy reconnaissance of the US carrier Midway in the Far East.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1-14 OCTOBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (4)

- 11 Oct: Red Star announced that the closed area in the Barents and Kara Seas for joint exercises would be extended until 10 November.

[REDACTED]

A Warsaw Pact exercise was conducted in Rumania

[REDACTED]

On 18 October, TASS announced the exercises and the attendance of Marshal Grechko, the defense ministers of Rumania, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary and military delegations of other Warsaw Treaty members.

- 12 Oct: Red Star reported that "intense combat training" was in progress in the Army and Navy and that military personnel were increasing their combat readiness which "now has to be maintained on the highest level."_____

- 13 Oct: Red Star stated that the recent Pact exercises have shown that the defense potential of the socialist states is adequate and that the joint armed forces are "ready to strike a retaliatory blow at the aggressor at any minute"; another article concerning the newly drafted class of 1943 said that peace is threatened and all Soviet soldiers are in a state of highest combat readiness.

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1-14 OCTOBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (5)

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15-21 OCTOBER 1962: DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA

- 15 Oct: Analysis of photos taken 14 October confirmed the presence of a Soviet medium range missile site near San Cristobal.
- 15 Oct: All remaining of the 24 SAM sites in Cuba, except Maldonado, had been identified.
- 15 Oct: Photos of San Julian airfield showed that IL-28s were being uncrated.
- 16 Oct: The President was informed of the MRBM evidence, and the first of the series of meetings of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council was held to chart the US course of action.
- [REDACTED]
- 17 Oct: 39 MIG-21s were identified at Santa Clara (a total of 42 was subsequently estimated).
- 17 Oct: More photographic evidence was obtained of MRBM sites in Cuba at San Cristobal and at Sagua la Grande. The IRBM sites near Guanajay were detected, but they, like the IRBM site subsequently found at Remedios, were probably not to be operational before December.
- 18 Oct: Four of the Komar missile boats had been deployed to Banes from Mariel.
- 18 Oct: The President saw Gromyko who stated that Soviet assistance to Cuba was only for defensive purposes.
- 18 Oct: The US authorized and began a series of military moves, particularly a reinforcement of air defenses in Florida and preliminary preparations for naval reinforcement of CINCLANT. A previously scheduled amphibious exercise in Puerto Rico served as cover for the movement of elements of the Atlantic Fleet to sea.
- 19 Oct: Radio Moscow stated that the US naval maneuvers in the Caribbean area were being carried out to prepare for an invasion of Cuba. The maneuver was described as "ridiculous" when rockets exist which are capable of carrying hydrogen bombs around the earth to designated targets.
- 19 Oct: The latest version of FAN SONG radar (SAM guidance) was identified at one of the Cuban SAM sites.
- 19 Oct: Rumors were beginning to circulate in Washington that some major action was impending; the movement of aircraft into Florida continued. President Kennedy left on a campaign trip to preserve an appearance of "normalcy."
- 20 Oct: The President suddenly returned from his campaign trip because of a "slight cold."

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[REDACTED]

15-21 OCTOBER 1962: DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA (2)

- 20-21
Oct: US military preparations were intensified, with various Marine units prepared for movement, preparations under way for the reinforcement of Guantanamo, further reinforcement of southern Florida, stationing of four destroyers between Cuba and southern Florida, and other preparatory alerts and preparations for further movements.
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Oct: There was apparently a drop in Soviet press comment on Cuba, Pravda on 20 October carrying only a roundup concerning US public opinion on policy toward Cuba, suggesting a lull awaiting US actions. By 20 October, sufficient evidence of US preparations must certainly have been available to Moscow, if not sooner, to indicate that some strong US reaction was likely. On 21 and 22 October, the US press carried articles stating that a major US policy decision was pending.

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- 20 Oct: Work at the MRBM sites was continuing. [REDACTED]

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15-21 OCTOBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS

15 Oct: Khrushchev told Kekkonen that, while he had expected the US to attack Cuba in late August or early September, he now believed that the US would not take direct action. He said he was bound to no timetable on Berlin and did not believe that the West would start a nuclear war over Berlin.

15 Oct: The USSR announced that there would be extended rocket firings into the Pacific during the period 16 October to 30 November. The first extended test was made on 16 October.

15 Oct: A high-level Polish political delegation, headed by Gomulka, arrived in East Germany for a four-day visit which concluded with a communique stressing the urgent need for a German peace treaty.

16 Oct: Khrushchev, in an interview with Ambassador Kohler, reaffirmed the Soviet intent to take no action on Berlin prior to the US elections; he mentioned the possibility of visiting the UN in late November or early December but did not commit himself.

16 Oct: An All-Army Conference on Ideological Questions opened in Moscow and was addressed some time during the session (which apparently concluded 25 October) by Marshal Malinovsky.

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- 18 Oct: An unconfirmed SHAPE report stated that shuttle trains arriving in East Germany beginning 18 October were filled and those returning were empty. (A later report as of 12 November said that three-fourths of the returning trains were empty resulting in an apparent troop increase in GSFG.)
- 18 Oct: Bucharest announced the termination of Warsaw Pact exercises in Rumania and the attendance of Marshal Grechko and others (see previous items).
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- 18-22 Oct: A Soviet naval detachment visited the East German port of Rostok; it was headed by the Commander of the Baltic Fleet and received by Ulbricht 19 October.
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- 19 Oct: Gomulka told the East German parliament that a peace treaty with East Germany would be concluded in the very near future. There were hints in the Soviet press that Moscow might be preparing to demand the seating of both Germanys in the UN; Pravda omitted Ulbricht's reference to continuing US-Soviet discussions after the US elections.
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20-21 Oct: The press reported that Soviet troops moved into a permanent observation post near Bernauerstrasse in the northern part of Berlin, a move occasionally employed by the USSR at times of expected border tension.

[REDACTED]

15-21 OCTOBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (5)

21 Oct: Marshal Grechko apparently returned to Moscow from Sofia.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

The US press (AM) further stated that a major policy decision was impending.

A Pravda article carried in advance by TASS warned that "alarming news" had come in that Washington is "hatching another adventure."

Rapid construction was continuing at the Cuban missile sites; the possible nuclear warhead building at San Cristobal was completely assembled between 20-22 October.

A submarine was sighted alongside the Soviet naval tanker Terek in the North Atlantic (it was the Z-class submarine which had been on patrol in the western Atlantic since about 1 September and was then on its way home).

Guantanamo was reinforced by three Marine battalions and the dependents were evacuated.

The dispersal of bombers of the Strategic Air Command began, and preparations were made to implement an increased airborne alert of SAC aircraft.

US allies and the Soviet Ambassador were informed of US plans in the afternoon, prior to the President's speech; the US called for an urgent UN meeting.

1900 EDT: President Kennedy made his quarantine speech, announcing US plans to cut off the shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba, describing the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba, and warning of US retaliation if the missiles in Cuba were used against the Western Hemisphere.

US forces worldwide went on DEFCON 3 coincident with the President's speech.

The US continued other military preparations, including a buildup of forces for possible action against Cuba. The US press on 29 November stated that five US Army divisions had been earmarked for a possible invasion of Cuba (the 82d and 101st Airborne, the 1st and 2d Infantry, and the 1st Armored); only the latter actually moved, beginning 22 October from Texas.

Havana radio stated that Cuban forces had been ordered on an alert.

Soviet media failed to react to the President's speech for six hours.

21 Oct: Marshal Grechko apparently returned to Moscow from Berlin.

The US press (AM) further stated that a major policy decision was impending.

A Pravda article carried in advance by TASS warned that "alarming news" had come in that Washington is "hatching another adventure."

Rapid construction was continuing at the Cuban missile sites; the possible nuclear warhead building at San Cristobal was completely assembled between 20-22 October.

A submarine was sighted alongside the Soviet naval tanker Terek in the North Atlantic (it was the Z-class submarine which had been on patrol in the western Atlantic since about 1 September and was then on its way home).

Guantanamo was reinforced by three Marine battalions and the dependents were evacuated.

The dispersal of bombers of the Strategic Air Command began, and preparations were made to implement an increased airborne alert of SAC aircraft.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

22 Oct 62 - 2

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR

[REDACTED]

Moscow requested assurance of beacons for several Arctic airfields.

USAREUR reported the recent completion of a second GSFG tactical pipeline to Allstedt (southwestern East Germany).

The West German press reported that Soviet soldiers had been sighted at four locations along the Berlin Wall.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

22 OCT 62 - 1

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - SATELLITES

[REDACTED]

The Polish press reported that the release of conscripts had begun.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(Tuesday) 23 Oct 62 - 1

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

Various US preparatory moves were announced--a world-wide military alert, deployment of air defense units to the east coast, an extension of Navy and Marine tours by one year, etc. The President signed the order authorizing the callup of 150,000 men.

PM: The President issued a proclamation making the blockade effective at 1000, 24 October (EDT).

The OAS unanimously endorsed US action.

Fourteen hours after the President's speech, Moscow radio carried the Soviet Government statement charging the US with piracy, calling all arms to Cuba defensive, warning that the US was counting thermonuclear war and referring to the Soviet nuclear capability as an effective deterrent. It ignored the question of missile sites and was noncommittal about specific Soviet counteraction or intention to support Cuba against any US action, but said that the USSR would strike a retaliatory blow "if the aggressors touch off a war." It distorted the President's warning that a missile strike from Cuba against any Western Hemisphere country would be met with a full retaliatory response on the USSR, claiming that he had said that the US would strike a retaliatory blow if a single nuclear bomb fell on US territory. It stated that the Soviet Union was requesting Security Council consideration of US violations of the UN charter.

Fifteen minutes before this release, Moscow radio carried a statement denouncing the President's speech and stating that he had said that Cuba was being turned into an "important strategic base" of the USSR but without mentioning missiles. Foreign audiences but not the Soviet people were informed that the President had alleged that offensive rocket weapons were being set up in Cuba, which was described by Moscow as "mythical."

Moscow began a series of announcements (which continued throughout the week) describing a wave of workers' protest meetings throughout the USSR expressing solidarity with the Soviet stand.

Of total Moscow radio commentary, 48% was devoted to Cuba, with the total rising to 76% on the 24th and maintaining close to this percentage through the 28th (an extent unmatched in any previous international crisis).

The President of TASS reportedly stated in Hiroshima that the Soviets would sink US ships if Soviet ships were attacked. A similar statement was reportedly made by the Soviet MA in Washington.

Of the nine Soviet surface-to-surface missile sites in Cuba, four MRBM sites were considered fully operational, and two others had some operational capability. The three IRBM sites were under rapid construction with an estimated operational capability of the first group.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

23 Oct 62 - 2

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS (2)

[REDACTED]

Castro announced "mobilization" and Cuban armed forces were put in a state of alert. Cuban messages reflected on alert status and intensified patrol of the coasts.

[REDACTED]

Castro, in a 90-minute speech, denied the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba and categorically refused to allow any inspection of Cuban territory.

Soviet leaders greeted a delegation of Rumanian leaders returning from Central Asia, and most of the Presidium attended a dinner for the Rumanians and the theater.

Moscow announced that the ambassadors of the socialist countries had been asked to call on Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov.

[REDACTED]

Gromyko arrived in East Berlin from his trip to the UN.

[REDACTED]

of air defense units to the east coast, an extension of Navy and Marine tours by one year, etc. The President signed the order authorizing the callup of 150,000 men.

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Of the nine Soviet surface-to-surface missile sites in Cuba, four MRBM sites were considered fully operational, and two others had some operational capability. The three IRBM sites were under rapid construction with an estimated operational capability as of the first week of December. There was no firm evidence of the presence of nuclear warheads at any of the sites, but some construction was under way which was suspected to be nuclear storage bunkers.

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[REDACTED]

Gromyko arrived in East Berlin from his trip to the UN.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

23 Oct 62 - 3

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR

The USSR announced deferment of release of troops in the Strategic Rocket Forces, PVO and submarine fleet, cancellation of all leaves, and orders to "raise the battle readiness and vigilance of all troops."

Marshal Grechko ordered representatives of the armies of the Warsaw Pact to "carry out several measures in increasing the military preparedness" of Pact forces.

[REDACTED]

The USSR cancelled travel by foreign diplomats and recalled most foreigners already travelling to Moscow immediately.

Observations in Moscow indicated normal activity; this continued through the crisis.

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

23 Oct 62 - 4

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR (2)

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The USSR cancelled travel by foreign diplomats and recalled most foreigners already travelling to Moscow immediately.

Observations in Moscow indicated normal activity; this continued through the crisis.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

23 Oct 62 - 5

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR (3)

According to a West German report, beginning 23-24 October, elements of four GSFG divisions were observed out of garrison with all movements westward; according to NORTHAG, small groups of Soviet troops were stationed in camps at a number of points along the zonal border (dates of actual movement not given).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

23 Oct 62 - 6

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

divisions were observed on 10 June 1954. NORTHAG, small groups of Soviet troops were stationed in camps at a number of points along the zonal border (dates of actual movement not given).

A collateral report stated that a ban was placed on the use of vehicles from factory motor pools for long-distance official travel; Communist Party functionaries in factories were alerted to tighten security on industrial installations, arms depots at factories were readied

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

23 Oct 62 - 7

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - CZECHOSLOVAKIA (2)

for immediate use and guards increased on installations; management staffs were put on extra shift. These measures were rescinded at small industrial establishments on 1 November but were still in effect as of 3 November at large plants.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - SATELLITES (Other than Czechoslovakia)

Traveler observations in the Erfurt/Eisenach area suggested possible implementation of an alert plan in the East German 4th Motorized Rifle Division with troops reported in the field and an EGA unit from Sonderhausen reported to have departed for field duty. The East German border command Erfurt/Eisenach area was possibly on an alert. (Note: most reports of East German alert measures are for 24 October - q.v.)

[REDACTED]

(Wednesday) 24 Oct 62 - 1

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

Khrushchev in a message to Bertrand Russell stated that the USSR would make no "reckless decisions," that a top-level meeting would be useful; he warned that if the US carried out its program of "pirate action" the USSR would have no alternative but to "make use of the means of defense against the aggressor"; the Soviet press gave heavy play to the exchange of messages between Russell and Khrushchev.

Mr. William Knox, US businessman, had a three and a quarter hour interview with Khrushchev at the latter's request. Khrushchev said that it was now too late for the US to take over Cuba, that eventually he would give orders to sink a US blockader if Soviet ships were stopped. He several times brought up the question of US missiles in Turkey, indicating that the US would have to learn to live with Soviet missiles in Cuba. He said the Soviets had AA and ballistic missiles with both nuclear and high-explosive warheads in Cuba, that these were 100% under Soviet control and would never be given to the Cubans. The missiles would not be fired except in defense of Cuba or the Soviet Union; if the US attacked Cuba, Guantanamo would disappear with the first action. He would not be the first to fire a nuclear weapon, but "if the US insists on war, we'll all meet together in hell." He would welcome a summit meeting; he had been planning and might still go to the UN this fall. He maintained the standard Soviet line on Berlin, but without threats.

Soviet propaganda carried numerous commentaries supporting the Soviet Government statement. The press emphasized the readiness of Soviet forces, featuring pictures of strategic rockets taking off, and there were repeated references to the warning of a Soviet retaliatory blow if war was unleashed. There were no explicit denials of the President's specific statements about the construction of missile sites, but the commentaries impugned the veracity of the President's allegations without denying them unequivocally. The statements claimed that the Soviet Union's powerful rockets obviated the need for missile sites outside the USSR and maintained that all weapons sent to Cuba were purely defensive in nature. The allegation of Soviet offensive rockets in Cuba was described as "false from beginning to end." Generally, the crisis was pictured more in terms of a US-Cuban dispute than a US-Soviet dispute, and it was maintained that it was absurd that Cuba could threaten the US. Propaganda remained equivocal as to the Soviet response to the quarantine measures and did not carry the statement of the President of TASS in Japan that, if the US attacked Soviet ships, the USSR would sink US ships.

A KGB officer stated that he did not expect war but that the Soviet Union would make a strong response to US action on Cuba (nature unspecified).

Traveler observations in the Erfurt/Eisenach area suggested possible implementation of an alert plan in the East German 4th Motorized Rifle Division with troops reported in the field and an EGA unit from Sunderhausen reported to have departed for field duty. The East German border command Erfurt/Eisenach area was possibly on an alert. (Note: most reports of East German alert measures are for 24 October - q.v.)

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The first of several small demonstrations against the US Embassy in Moscow occurred.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

24 Oct 62 - 2

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS (2)

It became apparent that the diversion of Soviet shipping from the quarantine zone had begun (this was apparently actually ordered and begun on 23 October).

The US Strategic Air Command went on DEFCON 2 with one-eighth of its aircraft on airborne alert.

US Polaris submarines put out from Holy Loch on secret courses (press).

Gromyko departed Berlin for Moscow; the Rumanian delegation left Moscow.

Hungarian and Bulgarian authorities possibly deliberately interfered with communications of the US legations in Budapest and Sofia.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

24 Oct 62 - 3

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR

Red Star carried an article from the Baku PVO District of 23 October stating that all personnel were at their combat posts and the rocketeers were "in the highest state of combat readiness"; an editorial said that the Soviet Government was "taking all necessary measures to ensure that it will not be taken by surprise" and that Soviet soldiers would double their vigilance and combat readiness.

The initial indications of preparations to activate alternate or dispersal airfields were noted in East Germany, with the movement of Soviet trucks to Schlathein airfield on the night of 24-25 October (this was followed by similar activity at several other fields in East Germany).

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

24 Oct 62 - 4

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR (2)

[REDACTED]

Observations suggested that GSFG and East German Army elements were returning to home stations.

24 Oct 67 - 5

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - EAST GERMANY

An East German Border Command defector stated his unit was placed on pre-alert at 240800 October, followed by higher combat readiness (Erhoehte Kampfbereitschaft) at 241500Z. Under this, all personnel were restricted, interior guard was ordered to return to home stations, line companies resumed patrolling, men were recalled from leave, discharges were suspended until further notice, border obstacle construction was suspended. No additional men, weapons or equipment were received, and no combat gas mask filters were issued.

A covert report states that the EGA and People's Police were placed on the highest state of alert readiness (Hoechste Alarmbereitschaft), but this is not confirmed. A French report of unknown reliability stated the EGA went on state of Alert Number 3 at 0001, 24 October.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

24 Oct 62 - 6

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - SATELLITES (Except East Germany)

[REDACTED]

Bulgaria announced a "general battle readiness" alert for its armed forces in compliance with the order of the Warsaw Pact command (the only Satellite to make such an announcement).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(Thursday) 25 Oct 67 - 1

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

US sources stated the blockade would be continued as long as the missiles stay (press).

More US troops moved into Key West.

A private letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev was said to have issued a very stern warning (press).

The US let the Soviet tanker Bukharest through the quarantine.

Zorin, at the UN, called the US photos forgeries (press).

The Soviet Union accepted, and the US agreed to discuss, a U Thant proposal of 24 October for simultaneous suspension of Soviet military shipments and the US blockade, but the US reaffirmed that the issue was the removal of the missiles (press).

Marshal Malinovsky told the French MA that Cuba is a dagger pointed at the heart of the US, that if the Soviets can put up with Turkey and Iran the US should be able to put up with Cuba.

Red Star said the Soviet people would offer Cuba all aid and support.

In two commentaries for foreign audiences, Radio Moscow claimed that there were no long-range rockets in Cuba, but generally the denials continued to be carefully hedged and to take the line that all weapons in Cuba were defensive in nature; the Soviet press and radio portrayed the UN Security Council session of 25 October as offering no proof that Cuba was a threat to the Western hemisphere. The Soviet press remained silent on the turnback of Soviet ships to Cuba, emphasizing "peaceful cargoes" to Cuba.

Pravda carried a dispatch from Washington warning against the possibility of further US action against Cuba and quoting a US press item citing Congressional circles as believing that if Cuba did not submit to US demands, "the invasion order could be given in the course of several days."

The Soviet Ambassador in Ankara attempted to induce the Turks to acquiesce in the missile exchange deal proposed in Khrushchev's 27 October letter.

Kharlamov told Kahler that control of the situation in the US had passed into the hands of the military, that the Soviet Union could not be talked to like Belgium or Luxembourg, but he showed a genuine desire for conciliation and talks.

The Soviet Ambassador in Djakarta told the Indian Ambassador that if the US sank ships, the Soviets would sink ships, but that the Soviets are willing to negotiate and would hold off their ships during talks; removal of the rockets should be negotiated.

[REDACTED]

At least 16 Soviet dry cargo ships en route Cuba were known to have reversed course (begin on 23 October), with tankers continuing toward Cuba and...

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25 Oct 62 - 2

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS (2)

Three Soviet F-class submarines were sighted 25 and 26 October near the quarantine zone and four were believed in the area (indicating departure from home bases at least by early October).

[REDACTED]

Photographic intelligence identified possible nuclear warhead storage sites at five of the launch sites in Cuba and provided the first identification of Soviet ground troops, at Remedios where a FROG launcher and 31 T-54s and 31 other armored vehicles were detected; a tank park of probable T-54s also found near Havana; rapid construction was continuing at the four MRBM sites with camouflage employed.

Photography of San Julian airfield showed two assembled IL-28s and 23 in crates.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25 Oct 62 - 3

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR

Red Star carried portions of Malinovskiy's speech to the Army ideological conference; it emphasized the power of Soviet missiles and the effectiveness of Soviet defenses against enemy nuclear attack but contained no direct reference to a preventive strike. It defined "highest combat readiness" as the ability to bring the might of the armed forces, at the first signal, "into immediate action against the enemy, his strategic military, economic and political centers and main concentrations of forces." In this, the role of the Strategic Rocket Forces "is extraordinarily great." (See appendix)

No public appearances of Soviet leaders were reported in the press, but a large array of Soviet marshals (including the commanders of all types of forces except Chuykov) and other leading officers attended the Rumanian Armed Forces Day reception in Moscow.

SECRET

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25 Oct 62 - 4

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR (2)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25 Oct 62 - 5

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR (3)

The Western Military Liaison Missions were denied travel 25 October - 4 November from two areas near the East-West German border in proximity to the autobahns and air corridors, no significant military activity was detected in the area during the restriction.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - SATELLITES

[REDACTED]

Heavy tracked vehicle movement was reported through Eisenach in the early morning, possibly indicating some local border alert exercise.

Elements of the East German 2d Motorized Rifle Regiment were observed preparing to leave home stations at Stahnsdorf; approximately one-half to two-thirds of the vehicles were apparently absent from the installation of the 23d Motorized Rifle Regiment at Sondershausen.

Observations in Czechoslovakia showed the Kolin tank and vehicle park which was full on 21 October to be empty on 25 October while additional equipment was seen at Striba (and continuing thereafter), suggesting some shift in dispositions for alert purposes. Generally, Czech garrisons throughout the alert showed most troops at home stations with a minimum of activity on roads and some evidence that vehicles were loaded for movement. A traveler, who reported that a Czech officer stated that the Czech Army was on an alert, also reported heavy military traffic between Prague and Eger 25-26 October (the latter point is on the West German border).

[REDACTED]

Attache observations in Bulgaria 25 October and continuing through the crisis showed generally that troops were in barracks areas, road traffic was very light, but more than the usual number of ambulances were on the roads; there were few additional security measures, and aircraft apparently were not dispersed. Some Bulgarian troops recently released from duty and some specialists from the reserves were reportedly called up during the week of 22 October.

A section of the Soviet portable tactical pipeline to Allstedt was dismantled.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(Friday) 26 Oct 62 - 1

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

The US issued a White House statement warning that further US action may be necessary because work on the missile sites was continuing "at a rapid pace."

The US was continuing its military preparations. A Marine HAWK battery further reinforced Guantanamo.

The UN announced that Khrushchev had ordered a temporary suspension of shipments to Cuba.

The US boarded a Lebanese ship en route to Cuba (the only ship actually boarded during the quarantine).

The President received a private letter from Khrushchev (not published) offering to withdraw the missiles under UN supervision in return for US agreement to lift the quarantine and give assurances against an invasion of Cuba; the letter was answered favorably by the President on 27 October (press).

The Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington (known to be head of the KGB) asked the diplomatic correspondent for ABC in Washington to inquire of the State Department whether the US would pledge not to invade Cuba if Castro agreed to dismantle the missile sites under international supervision.

A Pravda article for the first time made mention that the US was "said to have received information on the delivery of Soviet offensive rockets" to Cuba; Red Star described a heavy US military buildup in the Caribbean and Florida in advance of the President's 22 October speech; articles throughout the Soviet press repeatedly asserted that the blockade was merely a prelude to imminent US invasion of Cuba; the Red Star focus on Cuba remained intense with special attention to the readiness of Soviet rocket forces and large pictures of rockets on first two pages. A Red Star article entitled "Cuba Is Not Alone" stated that the peace-loving peoples have enough forces to curb a US invasion of Cuba, but no specific Soviet countermeasures against a US invasion were pledged.

Pravda carried an editorial called "Reason Must Triumph" calling on the US to realize that "the situation, aggravated to the extreme, can push the world into the abyss of war." A Pravda dispatch stated that the US had been taken to a line "beyond which a single step would take it to the calamity of war." Soviet propaganda generally emphasized the judgment displayed by the Soviet Union in seeking to avoid war, in contrast to the war hysteria in the US; there was one reference to the possibility of a summit meeting to counteract the threat of thermonuclear war.

The Moscow radio went out of its way to reassure the West on Berlin, stating that "no danger" threatens West Berlin.

Soviet leaders resumed their public appearances.

The British War Office reported it had received numerous requests from Soviet attaches to visit air bases, particularly those on which USAF units are based; the requests were refused.

[REDACTED]

26 Oct 62 - 2

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS (2)

Havana radio carried information on civil defense and air bombing and announced a campaign for blood donations (the call for blood donors was repeated during the following days).

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The US was continuing its military preparations. A Marine HAWK battery further reinforced Guantanamo.

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The British War Office reported it had received numerous requests from Soviet attaches to visit air bases, particularly those on which USAF units are based, the requests were refused.

26 Oct 62 - 3

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR

Red Star gave very heavy coverage to combat readiness generally and to the capabilities of the rocket forces in particular, with a full page of articles concerning training in various rocket units. It noted that the government order to increase combat readiness was directed first to the Strategic Rocket Forces which were "increasing their combat readiness and vigilance tenfold." Molinovskiy's definition of highest combat readiness, carried the previous day, was reiterated, with a reminder that measures were being taken by the Soviet Government "to prevent being surprised." Highest combat readiness and "trebled vigilance" were demanded of all forces.

A Red Star article, datelined "unidentified base, 25 October," indicated that most of the submarines from that base were at sea; "the submariners' piers are now sparsely populated; the majority of boats have gone to sea." (Note: This may be the first Soviet press reference to an apparent dispersal of submarines as part of the readiness measures; that such action was taken is further indicated in the 21 November order cancelling the alert and in Khrushchev's speech of 12 December.)

Another Red Star article described the increased vigilance of radarmen and signalmen in a PVO radar unit of the GSFG; reference was made to standing combat watch and duty shifts.

US attaches, testing the Soviet travel ban, were denied a trip to the Belorussian, Carpathian and Kiev MDs for the period 27-30 October.

A large number of Northern Fleet surface ships were reported operating off the Kola Inlet (see entry of 25 October).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

26 Oct 62 - 4

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR (2)

Observations generally indicated alert status of both GSFG and EGA units at or near home stations; a truck driver reported the Soviet caserne at Dallgow-Doeberitz had streets lined with trucks combat-loaded in march order and garages empty.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - SATELLITES

Observations showed no aircraft at certain normally occupied Czech airfields.

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BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - SATELLITES

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[REDACTED]

(Saturday) 27 Oct 62 - 1

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

Khrushchev issued a statement, carried by Moscow radio, stating that the Soviet Union would pull missiles from Cuba if the US did the same from Turkey; the missiles in Cuba are under Soviet control. The proposal was rejected by the US in a statement saying that the Cuban situation must be settled.

US officials stated that the US must act within a few days unless the Soviet build-up in Cuba stops (press). Stevenson was said to have told US allies the US would bomb the missile sites if dismantling was not begun soon (press).

In a speech delivered to the Supreme Soviet on 12 December, Khrushchev stated: "In the morning of 27 October we received information from our Cuban comrades and from other sources which directly stated that this attack (on Cuba) would be carried out within the next two or three days." Since immediate action to preserve the peace was needed, a message was therefore sent to the US President proposing that the US agree not to invade and call off the blockade and that the Soviet Union would then be ready to remove weapons described by the US as "offensive." (Note that despite this statement, the Khrushchev letter of 27 October did not call for this and that it was not until 28 October that the letter described above was sent; Khrushchev had, however, proposed this privately on 26 October.)

Soviet media failed to make any reference to Khrushchev's private letter to Kennedy of 26 October, but did carry his proposal for a trade of missile bases. Between the release of the 27 October letter and the 28 October letter, Soviet propaganda was generally of a time-marking character. There was no mention of the US rejection of the missile trade proposal, but propaganda put declining emphasis on the risks which the US was running, and there was no concerted campaign to push the missile exchange proposal. There were a few references, in the period 25-27 October particularly, suggesting that the US should remove its missile bases from Turkey and other bases abroad, but this question was not stressed.

The Soviet press, continuing to maintain there were no Soviet offensive sites in Cuba, laid increased stress on efforts to discredit alleged US "faked" photographs of missile pads under construction for the launching of offensive rockets.

The Soviet press ceased editorial comment on Cuba which was not resumed until 31 October although heavy news commentaries continued.

Red Star carried the US warning that further actions would be justified if aggressive military preparations continued in Cuba.

Moscow published Khrushchev's message to U Thant accepting his proposal to keep Soviet ships out of the interception zone temporarily, but no more Soviet ships turned back.

The US ordered 14,000 Air Force reservists to active duty.

Soviet leaders made no public appearances.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

27 Oct 62 - 2

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS (2)

The US warned that "counteraction" would be taken against any interference with air surveillance of Cuba (press).

A US U-2 was downed in eastern Cuba [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Castro issued a public announcement that every combat plane which invades Cuban air space can only do so at the risk of facing defensive fire. Havana radio claimed that AA batteries drove off unidentified planes in eastern Cuba on 27 October [REDACTED]

PI showed that the construction of MRBM and IRBM sites was continuing and provided additional evidence that each was to have a nuclear storage bunker. The assembly of IL-28s was also continuing.

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Polish Foreign Minister Ropacki postponed his scheduled visit to Yugoslavia because of the "strained international situation over Cuba."

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

27 Oct 62 - 3

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR

Red Star continued articles emphasizing combat readiness, stating that the Soviet Government "was forced to bring its armed forces to the highest state of combat readiness because of the tense international situation brought about by the US." The first deputy commander of the Ground Forces stated that "the danger of a new war has never been so near." Another article from a submarine base said there had been no outward signs of changes in the life of sailors since the Soviet statement on "US aggression"; "as before, ships go out to sea and return, take on torpedoes, refuel and resupply," but the sailors are "living in the highest state of combat readiness." (Note the implicit contrast with the item on submarines of the preceding day.)

A West European railroad group which had been in Moscow and Leningrad had observed no changes in the railroad administration from 22-27 October.

[REDACTED]

A night practice in Moscow for the 7 November parade was possibly used to cover the movement of missile and associated equipment through Moscow to points north and northwest of the city. (The purpose of this activity was not clear since a more effective concealment of missile movements could be achieved by use of peripheral roads outside the city.)

An F-3 report received subsequently from a former resident of Batumi stated that no unusual military activity was observed there except a patrol of the area by three MIGs; no naval vessels moved, no troop movements, no new security measures at transportation facilities or military installations; leaves not cancelled and no recruiting observed.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

27 Oct 62 - 4

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - SATELLITES

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(Sunday) 28 Oct 62 - 1

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

A Khrushchev message, broadcast at 0900 EST, stated that an order had been issued to dismantle weapons described as "offensive" and that instructions had previously been issued to cease further construction on the sites. He indicated his willingness to have the Soviet dismantling of missiles in Cuba subjected to verification by the UN but the precise method of verification was not clear and subject to further agreement. No mention was made of the Turkish base question. In return, he said he trusted Kennedy's "assurances" that there would be no invasion of Cuba. The message suggested that at some point in the negotiations he intended to press for an end of US overflights of Cuba and the USSR and also an end to peripheral reconnaissance of the USSR. The message stated that a US reconnaissance aircraft had intruded over Chukotsk on 28 October which could be taken for a bomber and "push us toward a fatal step." Also a violation of Cuban air space could have "dangerous consequences." Kuznetsov is going to the UN (he arrived that night).

Kennedy replied to the foregoing message stating that firm undertakings on the part of both governments should be promptly carried out. The US violation of Chukotsk was described as a navigational error by a nuclear sampling aircraft.

A lack of advance notice to Soviet propagandists on the Khrushchev statement was indicated by the fact that an hour after the message was released the text of the 27 October message was still being broadcast by Moscow in several foreign languages.

Soviet propaganda on the crisis reached a peak of 73 percent of total commentary time to all radio audiences, mostly given to broadcasting the Khrushchev statement.

Castro issued his five demands--an end of economic sanctions against Cuba, cessation of all subversive activities against Cuba, cessation of "pirate attacks," cessation of violations of Cuban space by US ships and planes, and US withdrawal from Guantanamo.

Saboteurs destroyed four power stations at the Maracaibo oil wells following the Cuban radio call for terrorism against US installations.

The Bloc began a propaganda campaign that unilateral US action had been averted by Khrushchev's moves and hailing the action as averting thermonuclear war and opening the way for solving many other questions by peaceful means.

A mass rally in Peiping was held in support of Cuba and a message was sent to the Cubans stating that any US imperialist provocation against Cuba "is a provocation against the Chinese people"; Peiping broadcast Castro's demand for US withdrawal from Guantanamo.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

28 Oct 62 - 2

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - SATELLITES

Several reports from Sofia indicated that during the week of 28 October-3 November city-wide meetings were held to discuss evacuation procedures in case of war; ambulance traffic in Sofia appeared unusually high. (Note: These were virtually the only reports of increased civil defense activity in the Bloc during the crisis.)

[REDACTED]

Observations in Czechoslovakia again showed several airfields void of aircraft; coverage of

dismantle weapons described as "offensive" and that instructions had previously been issued to cease further construction on the sites. He indicated his willingness to have the Soviet dismantling of missiles in Cuba subjected to verification by the UN but the precise method of verification was not clear and subject to further agreement. No mention was made of the Turkish base question. In return, he said he trusted Kennedy's "assurances" that there would be no invasion of Cuba. The message suggested that at some point in the negotiations he intended to press for an end of US overflights of Cuba and the USSR and also an end to peripheral reconnaissance of the USSR. The message stated that a US reconnaissance aircraft had intruded over Chukotsk on 28 October which could be taken for a bomber and "push us toward a fatal step." Also a violation of Cuban air space could have "dangerous consequences. Kuznetsov is going to the UN (he arrived that night).

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(Monday) 29 Oct 62 - 1

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

Kennedy named McCloy, Ball and Gilpatrick as a special team to coordinate diplomatic activity at the UN; the quarantine and air reconnaissance were to continue (press).

The US announced the quarantine would be lifted for two days for U Thant's visit to Cuba (beginning 30 October); air reconnaissance was also temporarily lifted.

A "high military source" in Moscow was quoted by the press as saying that Castro would probably have to go along with a Soviet-US settlement; the Turkey arms withdrawal was dropped by the Soviet Union because of the US attitude; a US invasion of Cuba would have made a Soviet military response inevitable in his opinion. (Note: This was not reported officially and the source is not known.)

Kuznetsov informed U Thant that the missiles were now being dismantled and shipped out and that when dismantling was completed the USSR would report to the Security Council and propose that a UN team be sent to verify the dismantling. However, the USSR would not permit the UN to inspect incoming Soviet ships to verify that they were not carrying offensive arms but would accept such inspection by Red Cross representatives from neutral countries.

Low-level reconnaissance of 18 missile launch positions showed nine had the erectors moved out of sight, but construction was continuing at two of the probable nuclear weapons storage sites and at least two of the MRBM sites. The arched roof structures, believed for the housing of nuclear weapons, had been completed at three of the MRBM sites and were under construction at all others except one. Camouflage and concealment of the sites was continuing.

[REDACTED]

The Soviet Charge in Budapest asked the US Legation Counselor at the Turkish National Day reception when the US Government would reply to the Soviet proposal that the US dismantle missile bases in Turkey.

Czech leader Novotny arrived in Moscow (the first of the Satellite leaders to make the junket to see Khrushchev except for the Rumanians who were there when the crisis broke); Novotny left on 31 October.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
29 Oct 62 - 2

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR

Abnormal travel restrictions on Western attaches and diplomats were lifted in the USSR.

The press quoted a high Soviet military source as stating that the ban on leaves in the armed forces would remain in effect until the US lifted the Cuban blockade; he also said that had the US attacked Cuba world war would have been inevitable. (Note: Presumably, this is the same source reported on the preceding page.)
[REDACTED]

Moscow announced the appointment of Army General Pavel Batov as Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact forces (probably a routine move unrelated to the crisis).
[REDACTED]

Collateral reports stated that transport aircraft landed at ten secondary airfields in East Germany in the vicinity of the corridors, while other sources indicated that such fields (Cochstedt, Allstedt, Hassleben and Erfurt/Bindersleben) were in full readiness to receive deployments (Soviet tents and various ground equipment items were present) but that no aircraft had been noted at the fields.

GSFG Commander Yakubovskiy stated that Soviet forces in the GDR bear a "special responsibility" in view of the aggressive policy of the West, and that his forces have everything necessary to strike a crushing blow against the aggressor and his rocket troops can hit any target.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

20 06 1961

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - SATELLITES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(Tuesday) 30 Oct 62 - 1

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

Gromyko informed Kohler that the USSR desired to reach an agreement as quickly as possible on the basis of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters; the Soviet Government "expects the US" will take steps promptly to facilitate a settlement and an agreement should "codify" obligations on both sides (i.e., US obligations to refrain from an attack on Cuba and to rescind the blockade and Soviet obligations to remove the weapons called "offensive" and Cuban obligations).

Kuznetsov told Stevenson the weapons would be dismantled and we could count on it, and then have whatever verification at the end of the process we wanted; Khrushchev had told him it would probably take two or three weeks. He was pleased the US would accept Red Cross inspection of incoming ships. He was clearly worried about Cuban objections to overflights. He averted several times to the removal of US bases which threaten the USSR as they had removed their base in Cuba.

U Thant arrived Havana where he had a most unsatisfactory talk with Castro who refused any inspection of Cuban territory.

The US temporarily lifted the quarantine for U Thant's visit.

Soviet delegates at the UN hinted at a reappraisal in the Soviet Union and a possible internal struggle

At least four Soviet submarines were still operating in the Cuban quarantine area, with all sighted on the surface at least once.

Ulbricht arrived in Moscow [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The East German delegation may have included some unannounced military personnel.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

30 Oct 62 - 2

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR

The Turks further claimed that the Swedes said that many Soviet submarines on 30 October passed through the Baltic to the Atlantic. This is not confirmed and unlikely. One W-class submarine did leave the Baltic on 26 October.

[REDACTED]

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - SATELLITES

East German Border Guard units in the Berlin area were reinforced 30-31 October and tanks were observed at Gross Glienicke; Border Guard defectors stated they had been told the reinforcement was made in view of the Cuban crisis and the alert of troops in West Berlin.

[REDACTED]

(Wednesday) 31 Oct 62 - 1

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

In Havana, U Thant's talks with Castro went very badly, with Castro in an impossible and intractable mood and extremely bitter at the Soviets for not consulting him; he declared categorically that there could be no inspection of any kind of Cuban soil. It was also clear the Cubans were excluded from the missile sites. The Cubans stated they would resist any violation of their air space, and a UN observer was sure that AA weapons under Cuban control would fire on US aircraft. Cuban-Soviet relations were described as "unbelievably bad."

A Soviet general Igor Stazenko, who claimed to be commander of Soviet forces in Cuba, told the UN delegation that instructions on the dismantling had been received from Khrushchev Sunday afternoon (28 October) and that dismantling had started at 5 PM and would be completed by 2 November at the latest, when the sites would be bulldozed. Castro claimed all AA was manned by Cubans and that they shot down the U-2. A UN delegate expressed the view the Soviet military were fed up and wanted to get out as soon as possible; the delegation believed both all offensive weapons and all Soviet military would depart. Stazenko said that none of the IRBMs had become operational, but that six or eight of the MRBMs had been operational, that all missiles had not yet arrived in Cuba but he was not specific as to how many were still to come. He said there were about 5,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, plus civilian laborers bringing the total to 8,000-10,000 and that all Soviets in Cuba were under his control. (Note: The press reported the main points on Soviet pledge to get the missiles out by Friday and Castro's adamant but not the details.)

It was learned that Mikoyan was leaving Moscow for Havana via New York.

US sources stated that the US pledge not to invade Cuba does not rule out force if Castro poses a new threat to the Western Hemisphere (press).

The US ordered a resumption of the quarantine and air reconnaissance.


The Soviet press carried articles emphasizing that US pledges to respect the integrity of Cuban territory must be honored and stating that the application of Castro's five points would contribute to normalizing the situation in the Caribbean area and that these principles have broad support.

Kuznetsov twice stated to McCloy that all AA weapons were in Cuban hands and said the dismantling of missile facilities would be completed by 2 or 3 November; verification must be worked out with Castro, but the USSR was prepared to fulfill its obligations. McCloy warned that US reconnaissance was resuming and a most dangerous situation would arise if our planes were to be shot at or downed.

[REDACTED]

points, and increasing Soviet press charges that the US was trying to keep the Cuban-Soviet pact as a pretext to deny out negotiations on inspection; the Moscow radio

The Turks further claimed that the Swedes said that many Soviet submarines on 30 October passed through the Baltic to the Atlantic. This is not confirmed and unlikely. One W-class submarine did leave the Baltic on 26 October.



BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - SATELLITES

East German Border Guard units in the Berlin area were reinforced 30-31 October and tanks were observed at Gross Glienicke; Border Guard defectors stated they had been told the reinforcement was made in view of the Cuban crisis and the alert of troops in West Berlin.

tractable mood and extremely bitter at the Soviets for not consulting him; he declared categorically that there could be no inspection of any kind of Cuban soil. It was also clear the Cubans were excluded from the missile sites. The Cubans stated they would resist any violation of their air space, and a UN observer was sure that AA weapons under Cuban control would fire on US aircraft. Cuban-Soviet relations were described as "unbelievably bad."

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[REDACTED]

31 Oct 62 - 2

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS (2)

The Soviet Ambassador to a Western European country was reportedly personally briefed by Khrushchev who said that all available information had indicated the US was prepared to invade Cuba soon after the blockade was instituted, and that he made the decision to withdraw the missiles on this basis and in the belief that a Soviet-controlled Cuba without missiles was of more advantage to the USSR than a US-occupied Cuba.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

31 Oct 62 - 3

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - USSR

Red Star carried an article stating that Soviet forces were in "a state of immediate combat preparedness."

Red Star devoted an editorial and full page of articles to the submarine fleet; it gave somewhat unusual emphasis to its defensive as well as offensive role. The difficulties involved for submarine crews in maintaining the highest combat readiness for a long period were noted. The editorial said there should be more flexible political training with submariners because the submarines now are often at sea completing the last missions of the training year.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - SATELLITES

A report that Polish reservists had been recalled and that university students were being notified at night to report for duty suggested a possible fairly extensive covert augmentation of Polish forces.

No significant developments on this particular date were reported other than a continuation of activities previously noted.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

Mikoyan arrived in New York en route Havana; he conferred with McCloy who concluded he was going to Havana to placate Castro.

The press reported the US military buildup in Florida was continuing.

Castro gave a speech in which he reaffirmed his refusal to permit an inspection team on Cuban territory, reiterated his demands (including evacuation of Guantanamo) and said the Soviet Union had proposed Red Cross inspection of Soviet ships bound for Cuba in lieu of the US blockade.

The US renewed the quarantine.

Photography revealed that all known MRBM sites in Cuba were being or had been dismantled, the launch pads were destroyed, apparently by bulldozing, and missiles and launch equipment had been removed. Construction at the IRBM sites had stopped, and the installations were partially destroyed. Work on the probable nuclear warhead bunkers had also apparently ceased. Work was continuing on IL-28s at San Julian but evidence was inconclusive as to whether the bombers were being assembled or dismantled.

The Chinese Communists continued their vigorous support of Castro and his five points in a note from Chen Yi to the Cuban Charge in Peiping; "the US imperialist provocation against you is tantamount to a provocation against us."

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

USAREUR noted slight indications that GSFG was beginning to return to more normal training activity, but indications of an alert status continued. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

Mikoyan in New York announced support for Castro's five demands and departed for Havana.

The US announced that the dismantling of missile sites was proceeding and Kennedy made a TV statement that sea and air surveillance would be maintained.

Work was reported under way to arrange International Red Cross inspection of the dismantled sites.

The uncrating and assembly of IL-2bs was continuing at San Julian.

[REDACTED]

A second sabotage effort was made against the Venezuelan oil installations.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Bulgarian Party leader Zhivkov arrived in Moscow and was received the following day by Khrushchev.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]

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BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]

3 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

Mikoyan, in Havana, reaffirmed support of Castro.

The US agreed to IRC inspection of Cuba-bound Soviet ships but was reported still insisting on a ground check of the missile sites.

Abandonment of the missile sites was continuing.

Varoshilov was resurrected to write an article in Pravda supporting Khrushchev.

Polish party leader Gomulka arrived in Moscow to confer with Soviet leaders.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4 Nov 62-1

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

A Soviet commentary to Cuba more firmly committed the USSR to support of Castro's five points, and increasing Soviet press charges that the US was failing to keep its part of the Cuban bargain suggested an effort to draw out negotiations on inspection; the Moscow radio called for an end to the blockade.

Kuznetsov, in a talk with McCloy, expressed doubt that the Soviets could obtain Castro's agreement to UN verification, stated the Soviets had a total of 40 missile sites in Cuba (of which 16 uncompleted) and that 42 missiles had been introduced; all sites were dismantled by 2 November. The USSR would give the US a schedule of removal of the missiles, allow us to bring ships alongside and count the missiles; the entire removal job could be effected by 10 November. In return, the Soviets wanted the quarantine lifted and a protocol of US guarantees including guarantees that the US would not invade Cuba and would induce other Latin American states to do the same. He also sought a guarantee of no subversive action against Castro and UN observation in the US as well as in Cuba.

Photography revealed that missile equipment was arriving at Cuban ports and that some was being loaded aboard ships; foreign observers in Cuba reported the movement of Soviet troops toward the port of Mariel as well. Assembly of IL-28s was continuing at San Julian, and additional IL-28 crates identified at Holguin brought the total of known IL-28s, assembled or in crates, to 42.

An additional cruise missile site was identified at La Sierra, near Cienfuegos (the equipment was probably moved from Campo Florido and returned to the latter site 27 November).

Ulbricht and Gomulka left Moscow.

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BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

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[REDACTED]

4 Nov 62 - 2

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET - 1

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

The US press reported that the Soviet Union was said to have told the US it would permit US inspection of missiles as they leave Cuba (apparently Kuznetsov's statements to McCloy); McCloy was also said to have warned Kuznetsov that a turnover of IL-28s to Cuba would bring the crisis to an acute stage.

The Havana press stated the US U-2 had been shot down by Cuban AA batteries.

Three Soviet ships which had been loading missile-associated equipment at Mariel had apparently departed, with a fourth loading.

The Aleksandrovsk, among the ships departing Cuba, carried six probable missile nose cones en route to Guba Okolnaya in the Northern Fleet area, where it arrived on 23 November [REDACTED]

The International Red Cross announced the Cuban government had agreed to its inspecting ships bound for Cuba.

Chinese Communist support for Castro continued at a high level, with hundreds of thousands demonstrating in Peiping on 4 and 5 November. The People's Daily compared appeasement of the Cuban people to Munich. Similar statements came from Tirana.

The Bulgarian Communist Party Congress opened with the removal of Premier Yugov and others from their government and party posts in an anti-Stalinist move.

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[REDACTED]

5 Nov 42 - 2

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

6 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

The US press reported another unpublicized letter was sent by Khrushchev to Kennedy (probably in regard to inspection of Soviet ships).

Kuznetsov and Zarin, in talks with Stevenson and McClay, provided the planned shipping schedule for departures of several Soviet ships carrying missiles from Cuban ports on 6 and 7 November. Kuznetsov described the question of the removal of warheads as a "detail"; no doubt the warheads would be removed "if warheads are indeed in Cuba"; the Soviet Union is removing everything related to "so-called offensive missiles" and cannot say more than that. The Soviets expressed surprise that the US should regard IL-28s as offensive since they are obsolete and good only for coastal defense; they are not offensive and Kuznetsov indicated they would not be removed.

Soviet FROGs were identified by photography at the military camp at Artemisa, the second sighting of these in Cuba (the other at Remedios on 25 October). Four well-equipped Soviet armored encampments were now identified in Cuba with tanks, SU-100 self-propelled guns and armored personnel carriers.

There were references in Soviet operator chatter (and again on 12 November) to the construction of winter quarters and to replacing the tents.

A "fifth" Soviet submarine was sighted in the quarantine area (surfaced about 100 miles south of Jamaica); three of the other four submarines in the quarantine area were believed continuing on course away from the Caribbean. (Despite this sighting of a possible fifth submarine, only four are believed to have operated in the area.)

Cuban exile Garcia Chabon claimed that missiles were hidden in underground sites in seven locations (one of several reports and claims to this effect).

Kosygin, making the keynote address on the eve of the revolutionary holiday, described the Cuban outcome as a compromise from both sides, defended the pullout of the missiles and promised continued support to Cuba.

Kadar of Hungary departed on the trek to Moscow, rounding out the visits of Eastern European Satellite leaders except for Albania.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

A traveller reported the apparent activation of a previously abandoned garrison in the town of Dzhulfa (on the Iranian border). No unusual rail or other activity was noted during the trip.

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CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

The holiday celebrations in Moscow were marked by a routine military parade and a speech by Marshal Malinovskiy stressing peaceful coexistence; he praised Khrushchev personally for having saved the peace in the Cuban situation.

Khrushchev at the Kremlin reception implied he had abandoned his earlier plan to come to the UN, stating that a meeting with President Kennedy was not necessary now and that he would favor heads-of-government talks only "if it is a question of peace and war." He did not press the Berlin question, ridiculing Western press speculation regarding a Soviet timetable for a separate peace treaty. He displayed sensitivity to Western views that he had backed down in the Cuban crisis, defended the necessity of flexibility in foreign policy and said it was futile to ask "who won and who lost." He acknowledged that Castro had opposed his decision to remove the missiles but said that he had told the Cubans not to do so would have meant war. If a formal US guarantee on Cuba is not forthcoming, he said, this would "put us back to a position of catastrophe." He downplayed the significance of "40 rockets" in Cuba, saying that "even 140 wouldn't be enough." To newsmen, he reportedly further said that a week ago "we were on the edge of the precipice of nuclear war. Both sides were ready for it."

Ambassador Kahler reported that from the remarks of almost every Soviet official it seemed clear that events of the past ten days had really shaken the Soviet leadership. There were no signs that the leadership was divided. The most striking element was an extension of the definition of "peaceful coexistence" to include the concept of the necessity of mutual concessions to prevent a conflict. Khrushchev stated that he now thought the previously-discussed meeting with Kennedy should not be rushed into and that there should be advance preparation for one or more questions, so that agreement would be in view.

The US press disclosed the agreement with the Soviets to contact and "inspect" ships outbound from Cuba and that the Soviets were hedging on withdrawal of the bombers. Responsible US sources were quoted as discounting the "cave" reports.

Assembly of IL-28s at San Julian was continuing, but there was no evidence that the IL-28s at Holguin were being unpacked.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

The Commander of the Soviet Far East Military District, speaking at the holiday celebration, said that his forces like all Soviet armed forces "have been put in a state of highest combat readiness."

Two leading Soviet officers (Marshal Chuykov, CinC of Ground Forces, and Marshal Vershinin, CinC of Air Forces) were missing from the 7 November parade in Moscow, a most unusual occurrence. Chuykov also was missing from the Rumanian reception on 25 October and his whereabouts throughout the crisis was unreported until 17 November when he was identified in Moscow. Vershinin was at the 25 October reception.

A traveler reported the presence of additional KNIFEREST radars at Yerevan.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

8 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

The US announced that all known MRBM and IRBM sites had been dismantled and some equipment was outbound on Soviet ships. The US was said by the press to be still insisting on on-site verification.

Thirty and possibly 31 missile transporters had been identified as being removed from Cuba and 20 were under way on Soviet ships on deck.

Photography continued to show no change in the status of IL-28s in Cuba.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

An East German border command defector subsequently reported that some men had been discharged on 8 November but that the East German alert was to remain effective until 15 December.

[REDACTED]

9 Nov 62 - 1

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

The US began "alongside" inspection of several outgoing Soviet ships carrying missiles (first inspection was on 8 November).

The last of the Soviet ships identified as missile carriers left Cuba, and observations showed a total of 37 missiles had left on seven of the nine ships.

A US helicopter detected possible nuclear material aboard the outgoing Soviet vessel Bratsk, but subsequent inspection with nuclear-detection instruments on 11 November produced negative results. (Note: This was one of two ships possibly detected carrying radioactive material from Cuba, both very tenuous; see entry on the Aleksandrovsk.)

The press reported that the Soviets were still balking on the removal of bombers and on-site inspection, and the press quoted the Cuban UN delegate as declaring that Cuba regarded the IL-28s as its property and had no intention of giving them up.

Photography continued to show no further uncrating of IL-28s, although work was apparently continuing on the engines of three of them at San Julian.

The Soviet military camp at Holguin was shown by photography to contain nine SU-100 assault guns, four PT-76 tanks, nine possible SNAPPER anti-tank missiles and 31 tanks. At Remedios, there were six probable FROG transporters. The four Soviet camps (Holguin, Remedios, Artemisa and San Antonio de las Vegas) were judged to be composite armored groupments of near regimental strength.

[REDACTED]

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Kadar left Moscow.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
9 Nov 62 - 2

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

An East German border guard defector reported the East German alert was still in effect as of 9 November.

[REDACTED]

10 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

All Soviet ships said by the USSR to be carrying missile components from Cuba, except one, had been inspected by US ships without incidents, and photography had confirmed a total of 42 outgoing missiles.

U Thant said he hoped to announce arrangements for IRC inspection of inbound Soviet ships.

Communist propaganda calling for withdrawal of US bases from Cuba was increasing.

Photography indicated air-to-air missiles were apparently being readied for mounting on MIG-21s at Santa Clara airfield, the first observation of these missiles in Cuba.

Photography provided fairly conclusive evidence that assembly of IL-28s was continuing at San Julian airfield, but there was no evidence of unpacking at Holguin.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

The East Germans conducted the normal fall induction 10-13 November.

A Danish ship was denied entrance to Stralsund, East Germany, for unknown reasons; the restriction on commercial shipments into Stralsund was apparently still in effect on 13 November. There were rumors missiles from Cuba might be unloaded at non-Soviet Baltic ports, but no evidence of this was obtained.

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[REDACTED]

11 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

A US spokesman (Gilpatrick on TV) publicly confirmed the US had counted out 42 missiles.

[REDACTED]

Photography of San Julian showed seven of the 11 uncased IL-28s were the trainer version, indicating they were probably intended for the Cubans. There was more evidence that air-to-air missiles were being installed in the MIG-21s.

Soviet commentators increasingly claimed that, since the Soviet Union had carried out its obligations by withdrawing the missiles, the US should lift the blockade.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

12 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

The US was reported still determined in negotiations with the Soviets to secure the removal of the IL-28 bombers; Kuznetsov told the Indonesian Ambassador at the UN that the US was delaying a settlement of long-term problems and charged that the US demand for withdrawal of the IL-28s was nonsense since they were obsolete and can only be used as short-range defensive weapons.

Khrushchev informed the British Ambassador that the IL-28s in Cuba had been about to be scrapped when his marshals suggested sending some of them to Cuba in response to President Kennedy's callup of 150,000 reservists. He maintained this was not a serious issue and that the USSR had already fulfilled its obligations in removing the missiles.

A Moscow government official, urging local committees to submit immediately material needed for the 19 November plenum, said "everything has been at a standstill, but is now being resumed again."

More US troops were reported moving into South Florida (press).

Photography of Santa Clara airfield showed continuing arming of the MIG-21s with air-to-air missiles.

A Polish general was reported to have briefed senior officials and to have said that Mikoyan was having a difficult time dealing with Castro over the presence of Chinese Communist "technicians" manning AA weapons in Cuba. The Chinese were said to have been in Cuba at least 30 days and to have shot down the U-2, hoping to provoke war thereby. The general attempted to placate fears over Soviet military strength vis-a-vis the US. (Note: The story itself is, on the basis of all other information, false; however, sources in Poland believed that it was the story given high-level Polish officials, reflecting both a need to placate Polish fears and the Sino-Soviet struggle over Cuba.)

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

Photography of San Julian showed seven of the 11 uncased IL-28s were the trainer version, indicating they were probably intended for the Cubans. There was more evidence that air-to-air missiles were being installed in the MIG-21s.

Soviet commentators increasingly claimed that, since the Soviet Union had carried out its obligations by withdrawing the missiles, the US should lift the blockade.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]

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BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]

13 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Soviet Union and Cuba were alleged to have given U Thant a formula for the easing of the crisis which would include US withdrawal from Guantanamo and a halt in the US economic squeeze on Cuba (press).

The press reported some slight progress in Soviet-US negotiations at the UN but Kuznetsov told the Brazilian delegate a stalemate had been reached.

The press reported that Mikoyan again pledged backing to Castro's five demands in Cuba.

Plans for IRC inspection of incoming ships were dropped.

The Cubans claimed smashing of a CIA sabotage group.

Cuban naval leaves were terminated after some relaxation from 9-13 November.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

Red Star stated Soviet soldiers were not relaxing their vigilance "which is at the highest battle readiness" for one minute.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

14 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

Khrushchev was reported by the press to have sent a proposal for the removal of the bombers hedged with such conditions as US withdrawal from Guantanamo.

[REDACTED]

Photographs of San Julian showed camouflage netting over most of the IL-28s but apparently no more had been uncased; there was no evidence of uncasing at Holguin.

U Thant informed US negotiators that Castro was insistent on reciprocity in any measures for verification or inspection.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

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BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]

15 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

Castro, in a letter to U Thant, again refused any inspection of Cuban territory and stated that any aircraft which violates Cuban territory can do so only at the risk of being destroyed.

The press alleged that Cuba was possibly willing to accept inspection of missile bases in return for inspection of Guantanamo.

Accumulating evidence showed that Soviet ground force units were present in Cuba in greater strength than previously estimated, with analysis suggesting that the four camps at Artemisa, Santiago de las Vegas, Remedios and Holguin contained well in excess of 4,000 troops.

[REDACTED]

There continued to be no indication of the uncrating of IL-28 fuselages at Holguin while camouflage netting had been erected at San Julian to conceal the progress of the IL-28 assembly.

[REDACTED]

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

According to East German defectors, some alert measures, such as reinforced border patrols, were lifted on 15 November in the Border Command.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

16 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

Nothing new was reported.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

Observations in Czechoslovakia indicated a relaxation of the readiness status.

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[REDACTED]

17 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

US-Soviet negotiations were reported near deadlock (press).

A Cuban sabotage group was seized in New York.

The Havana radio broadcast orders from Cuban military authorities to clear the skies over Cuba of all domestic aircraft by early morning of 18 November, and a notice to airmen prohibited all flights until otherwise notified. Havana also announced that Castro's warning that aircraft would be shot down came into operation at 1100Z.

The Cuban Government sought permission from Belgium, West Germany and Canada for overflight clearances for three IL-18s to be ferried from Moscow to Havana between 19 and 25 November.

[REDACTED]

Marshal Chuykov, writing in Red Star, stressed the role of the Party in the Soviet armed forces and intimated that some military personnel were criticizing the political leadership for "spoiling" Soviet military successes.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

18 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

The US Government was reported (press) to be concerned about evidence of Soviet troop units in Cuba and would call for their removal.

The press reported a five-hour conference between McCloy and Kuznetsov.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

The Soviet Ministry of Defense order on Soviet Artillery Day stated that the Party and Government were doing everything to see that the Soviet Army and Navy are at the level of their missions and can deliver a crushing retaliatory strike against an aggressor if he unleashes a war, and called for a high degree of combat readiness.

A traveler reported the presence of about 100 fighters at Tikhoretsk airfield (Transcaucasus), apparently a new occupation of the field.

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19 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

Castro sent a letter to U Thant (carried by Havana Radio, 20 November) stating that the IL-28 aircraft belonged to the Soviet Government and, if the Soviets consider it advisable to withdraw them, Cuba will "not obstruct that decision." The letter warned again that to the limit of the range of Cuban AA weapons, any "warplane invading Cuban airspace can do so only at the risk of being destroyed," and again rejected any unilateral inspection of Cuban territory.

The press revealed the content of the Soviet-Cuban package proposals as including: on-site inspection in Cuba only in return for similar inspection of Guantanamo, Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone; a US pledge not to invade Cuba nor permit exiles to attack; and agreement to lift the blockade and talk about but not necessarily evacuate Guantanamo.

The CPSU Central Committee plenum convened and enacted a variety of administrative and organization changes, particularly in the economic field.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]

20 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

President Kennedy at a press conference announced that the US was lifting the Cuban quarantine. He further stated that he had received assurances from Khrushchev that the IL-28 bombers would go within 30 days and could be counted as they go, that all nuclear weapons were also withdrawn, and that a number of Soviet ground units which were associated with protection of the offensive weapons systems in Cuba "will also be withdrawn in due course." He indicated that parts of his agreement with Khrushchev remained to be carried out (inspection and lasting safeguards against future introduction of offensive weapons), implied that reconnaissance of Cuba would continue, and avoided any specific commitment against invasion.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

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BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
21 Nov 62-1

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]

SAC reverted from DEFCON 2 to DEFCON 3 at 2330Z.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

The USSR announced the cancellation of its emergency measures, stating that, in connection with President Kennedy's instructions on lifting the quarantine and on the basis of the understanding reached between Khrushchev and Kennedy, the Soviet Government had instructed its Defense Minister, effective 21 November, to: return the components of the armed forces from their various states of higher or full combat readiness (these are specified in the order) to normal combat readiness; to rescind the retention of overage senior servicemen in the Strategic Rocket Troops, the PVO and the submarine fleet; and to rescind the withholding of normal leaves. (See appendix for full text of this order.)

The USSR announced that, in connection with the easing of tension in the Caribbean and in Europe, the CinC of the Unified Armed Forces of the countries of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Grechko, gave instructions on 21 November for the abrogation of measures established on 23 October for increased combat readiness of troops and fleets forming the Unified Armed Forces.

A non-US source (reliability unknown) reported that Vitebsk (Headquarters, 103d Guards Airborne Division) was lightly occupied with no troops observed. (Note: This could presumably indicate that the troops had been confined to barracks or had moved out of the installations in connection with alert measures; there is, however, no indication from any other source that any airborne troops were redeployed in connection with the alert.)

[REDACTED]

21 Nov 62-2

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS (continued)

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

22 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

The US press announced that the US military had taken the following measures: released SAC bombers from unusual alert (nine out of ten reported on ground alert since 22 October), released 14,000 Air Force reservists effective 23 November, unfrozen Navy discharges. The Navy disclosed that 183 ships with 85,000 men had been involved in the Cuba quarantine buildup, including eight aircraft carriers.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

23 Nov 62

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

The last of the surface-to-surface missile related equipment (trailers, erectors, etc.) was apparently being withdrawn from Cuba.

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

There were no indications of any significant degree of alert continuing in any elements of the Bloc armed forces. A report received subsequently indicated that Bulgarian personnel held in service in connection with the October alert were released at some unspecified time after the termination of the preparedness measures.

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POSTSCRIPTS

Mikoyan finally left Havana on 25 November, with promises of continued Soviet friendship but no indication of new Soviet economic or military aid to Cuba or of a military guarantee.

Mikoyan visited Washington 29 November-1 December, taking the line with the President that Soviet missiles had been only defensive and erected because of invasion threats. He had no new instructions and it was agreed that negotiations would continue in New York.

The IL-28s were withdrawn from Cuba on three Soviet ships, 6-7 December.

In early December US reinforcements were withdrawn from Guantanamo and the dependents returned.

On 12 December, Khrushchev gave a speech to the Supreme Soviet dealing primarily with the question of war and the Cuban crisis (see appendix).

On 7 January, the US and the USSR released a letter to the UN Secretary General stating in effect that agreement had not been reached between them on any further action with respect to Cuba and that it would not be necessary for the item to occupy the further attention of the Security Council. The statement thus closed this phase of negotiations and indicated that, in the absence of agreement on inspection, the US had made no assurance against invasion and would continue air surveillance.

UNDATED ITEMS

According to a reported statement of a Cuban Communist (Emilio Aragones), made some time after the crisis, Fidel Castro had told him that Cuba had been an "atomic power" for a few weeks but it was no longer; there were no more nuclear weapons in Cuba.

According to a reported statement of the son of the Cuban Foreign Minister, Soviet-Cuban plans had been to install the missiles and then screen Cuban ports with major Soviet fleet units; the plan from the beginning called for the ultimate withdrawal of the missiles but at the price of US concessions to Cuba. The Cubans, who were not consulted on the decision to remove the missiles, reportedly felt that had the Soviet fleet units proceeded to Cuba the US would not have undertaken military action or endorsed the blockade.

According to a B-2 report as of May 1963, the Soviet intention not to go to war over Cuba in the event of a US invasion was formalized in a signed top secret decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This decision was made during the October crisis. The only reason for Mikoyan's prolonged stay in Cuba was to restrain Castro from attempting to shoot down another US reconnaissance plane. Khrushchev was terrified that such an act would spur the US to invade and did not permit Mikoyan to leave Cuba until he felt this danger had passed.

A report evaluated 3 from an unwitting crew member of a Soviet merchant vessel states that, in connection with the Cuban situation, some of the Soviet ships which were in home waters were kept ready under orders as reserve tonnage for the Navy. However, that was only for about a week, and it was mostly tonnage which had taken part in maneuvers with the Navy at Novaya Zemlya and in the fiords. (There is no indication as to the precise period involved.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UNDATED ITEMS (Continued)

There are several reports dealing with the attitude of the Soviet military on the introduction and removal of the missiles from Cuba. They include:

An implication by the Yugoslav Deputy G-2 to a US officer that it was the military who were responsible for the deployment of strategic missiles to Cuba. When Khrushchev realized the danger, he took a bold stand and agreed to their withdrawal.

A Brazilian report, said to have originated with a Soviet source in Washington, that the decision to install missile bases was due to the suggestion of the military who felt the island was indefensible by conventional warfare and intended to make any invasion as costly as possible, especially in economic terms, since one of the preferential targets for the missiles would have been the oilfields and petroleum industries in Texas.

A statement by an Izvestiya correspondent to a British official that the Cuban venture was urged on Khrushchev by the Soviet military who were alarmed at the US Minuteman program.

A reported statement by Khrushchev to a group of non-Bloc Communists that Malinovsky had questioned the wisdom of removing the missiles from Cuba and that Khrushchev had told him the settlement of the Cuban problem was not a defense question and not in Malinovsky's province.

A reported statement of a Cuban official that Soviet officers in Cuba were bitter about the removal of long-range missiles, felt that Khrushchev had backed down in the face of US threats and resented his failure to demand equal reciprocal commitments from the US.

A report that some 35 to 40 high-ranking military officers who are also members of the Supreme Soviet failed to appear for the Supreme Soviet session during December, allegedly because of displeasure over Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban crisis, and that there was considerable criticism by both military and civilian officials over the way Khrushchev acted during the crisis.

A reported statement by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in March that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba was a delicate matter and that there was opposition from "certain quarters" in the USSR.

At the time of the crisis during October, Mao Tse-tung is alleged to have sent an envoy to see Castro. The emissary is said to have made a "formal secret promise" that Communist China would invade Taiwan if the US invaded Cuba.

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APPENDICES

SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT MILITARY ORDERS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

Excerpt from the Soviet Government Statement of 11 September 1962: "The Soviet Government calls the attention of the world public and all governments which stand for peaceful coexistence to the fact that even now, when the United States is preparing an act of aggression and is increasing its armed forces for this purpose by calling up 150,000 reservists into the army, when the US President is asking Congress for permission to do this, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovskiy has ordered that those servicemen who have completed their term be discharged and then transferred to the reserves.

"Trained soldiers are being released from the Soviet armed forces and recruits are being called up to replenish the units. This alone is a clear enough indication of our peaceful intentions. No government would take such a measure if it contemplated any action of a military nature. One must realize what it means when trained soldiers are being released from the army and recruits called up who must yet be trained--and this is not so easy to do considering the complex military equipment of today, which requires a great amount of knowledge not only from commanders but from every private. In taking this step we are realizing measures in our daily life which confirm that the Soviet Union is following a policy of insuring peace and friendship with all peoples.

"The Soviet Union will not take any similar retaliatory action to the callup of 150,000 reservists in the United States, the more so since this cannot be of any serious military importance, given up-to-date means of nuclear rocket warfare. If in the past the yardstick for armies of the belligerents was mainly the number of soldiers, sabers, and bayonets, in our time the might of these armies is determined by a different yardstick--nuclear rocket weapons....

"The Government of the Soviet Union will do its utmost to safeguard peace and peaceful coexistence with all countries. But this does not always depend on us. The Soviet Union did not want World War II, but Hitler imposed it on us and we were forced to wage war. That is why we must do everything to be prepared, to see to it that our armed forces--the strategic rocket forces and the ground forces, the anti-aircraft defense, the navy, and especially the submarine fleet of the Soviet Union--are able to cope with their tasks. If the aggressors unleash war, our armed forces must be ready to strike a crushing retaliatory blow against the aggressor.

"The Soviet Government will not follow the way of the United States, which is calling up 150,000 reservists. If we imitated this US action, we would do what apparently is wanted by certain American circles: we would help them inflame the situation. But neither can we disregard the aggressive preparations of the United States. The Soviet Government considers it its duty in this situation to display vigilance and to instruct the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union and the command of the Soviet Army to take all measures to raise our armed forces to highest combat readiness. But these are exclusively precautionary measures. We shall do everything on our part so that peace is not disturbed."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Soviet Government Order of 23 October 1962: "The Soviet Government today ordered the USSR Minister of Defense to hold up the release of senior age groups in the strategic rocket troops, troops of anti-aircraft defense and personnel of the submarine fleet until further notice, to cancel the leave of all personnel and to raise the battle readiness and vigilance of all troops.

"The Soviet Government today, in connection with the provocative actions of the US Government and the aggressive intentions of the American armed forces, heard a report by Marshal Malinovsky, USSR Minister of Defense, on the measures carried out to raise the battle readiness of the armed forces."

Warsaw Pact Order of 23 October 1962: "The Commander in Chief of the united armed forces of the countries of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Grechko, has today summoned officers and representatives of the armies of the countries of the Warsaw Pact and gave an order to carry out several measures in increasing the military preparedness of troops and navies which are members of the united armed forces.

"This was done in connection with the provocative actions of the American Government and the aggressive intentions of the American militarists."

Soviet Government Order of 21 November 1962: "In connection with instructions by the President of the US, J. Kennedy, on lifting the quarantine--or blockade--against the Republic of Cuba and in connection with the recognition of the possibility for completely eliminating the consequences of the dangerous crisis which has arisen in the Caribbean area, and on the basis of the understanding reached between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers USSR, N. S. Khrushchev, and the President of the US, J. Kennedy, the Soviet Government has given instructions to the Minister of Defense USSR, Marshal SU R. Ya. Malinovsky, to carry out the following measures, effective 21 November 1962:

"1. Intercontinental and strategic rocket troops are to shift from full (or total) combat readiness to normal combat training and activity;

"2. The anti-aircraft rocket defense of the country and fighter aviation of the PVO are to shift from full combat readiness to normal activity and combat training;

"3. The combat readiness status (or state of constant combat preparedness) of strategic aviation is rescinded;

"4. The naval forces are to shift to normal combat training, and the submarine fleet is to return to the places of usual deployment (or permanent disposition);

"5. The state of increased (or higher) combat readiness in the ground forces is rescinded;

"6. The retention of overage senior servicemen of the Soviet Army due for release from the strategic rocket troops, the AA defense of the country (PVO Strany), and the submarine fleet is rescinded;

"7. The withholding of normal leaves in the armed forces is rescinded."

Warsaw Pact Order of 21 November 1962: "In connection with the easing of tension in the Caribbean and the related easing of tension in Europe, the Commander in Chief of the united armed forces of the countries of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal SU A. A. Grechko, on 21 November 1962 gave instructions for abrogation of measures established on 23 October 1962 for increased combat readiness of troops and fleets forming the united armed forces."

peaceful coexistence to the fact that even now, when the United States is preparing an act of aggression and is increasing its armed forces for this purpose by calling up 150,000 reservists into the army, when the US President is asking Congress for permission to do this, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovsky has ordered that those servicemen who have completed their term be discharged and then transferred to the reserves.

"Trained soldiers are being released from the Soviet armed forces and recruits are being called up to replenish the units. This alone is a clear enough indication of our peaceful intentions. No government would take such a measure if it contemplated any action of a military nature. One must realize what it means when trained soldiers are being released from the army and recruits called up who must yet be trained--and this is not so easy to do considering the complex military equipment of today, which requires a great amount of knowledge not only from commanders but from every private. In taking this step we are realizing measures in our daily life which confirm that the Soviet Union is following a policy of insuring peace and friendship with all peoples.

"The Soviet Union will not take any similar retaliatory action to the callup of 150,000 reservists in the United States, the more so since this cannot be of any serious military importance, given up-to-date means of nuclear rocket warfare. If in the past the yardstick for armies of the belligerents was mainly the number of soldiers, sabers, and bayonets, in our time the might of these armies is determined by a different yardstick-- nuclear rocket weapons....

"The Government of the Soviet Union will do its utmost to safeguard peace and peaceful coexistence with all countries. But this does not always depend on us. The Soviet Union did not want World War II, but Hitler imposed it on us and we were forced to wage war. That is why we must do everything to be prepared, to see to it that our armed forces--the strategic rocket forces and the ground forces, the antiaircraft defense, the navy, and especially the submarine fleet of the Soviet Union--are able to cope with their tasks. If the aggressors unleash war, our armed forces must be ready to strike a crushing retaliatory blow against the aggressor.

"The Soviet Government will not follow the way of the United States, which is calling up 150,000 reservists. If we imitated this US action, we would do what apparently is wanted by certain American circles: we would help them inflame the situation. But neither can we disregard the aggressive preparations of the United States. The Soviet Government considers it its duty in this situation to display vigilance and to instruct the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union and the command of the Soviet Army to take all measures to raise our armed forces to highest combat readiness. But these are exclusively precautionary measures. We shall do everything on our part so that peace is not disturbed."

"The Soviet Government today, in connection with the provocative actions of the US Government and the aggressive intentions of the American armed forces, heard a report by Marshal Malinovskiy, USSR Minister of Defense, on the measures carried out to raise the battle readiness of the armed forces."

Warsaw Pact Order of 23 October 1962: "The Commander in Chief of the united armed forces of the countries of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Grechko, has today summoned officers and representatives of the armies of the countries of the Warsaw Pact and gave an order to carry out several measures in increasing the military preparedness of troops and navies which are members of the united armed forces."

"This was done in connection with the provocative actions of the American Government and the aggressive intentions of the American militarists."

Soviet Government Order of 21 November 1962: "In connection with instructions by the President of the US, J. Kennedy, on lifting the quarantine--or blockade--against the Republic of Cuba and in connection with the recognition of the possibility for completely eliminating the consequences of the dangerous crisis which has arisen in the Caribbean area, and on the basis of the understanding reached between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers USSR, N. S. Khrushchev, and the President of the US, J. Kennedy, the Soviet Government has given instructions to the Minister of Defense USSR, Marshal SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy, to carry out the following measures, effective 21 November 1962:

"1. Intercontinental and strategic rocket troops are to shift from full (or total) combat readiness to normal combat training and activity;

"2. The antiaircraft rocket defense of the country and fighter aviation of the PVO are to shift from full combat readiness to normal activity and combat training;

"3. The combat readiness status (or state of constant combat preparedness) of strategic aviation is rescinded;

"4. The naval forces are to shift to normal combat training, and the submarine fleet is to return to the places of usual deployment (or permanent disposition);

"5. The state of increased (or higher) combat readiness in the ground forces is rescinded;

"6. The retention of overage senior servicemen of the Soviet Army due for release from the strategic rocket troops, the AA defense of the country (PVO Strany), and the submarine fleet is rescinded;

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RED STAR ON COMBAT READINESS, 5 OCTOBER 1962

The following is a summary of an article in Red Star of 5 October 1962 entitled "Combat Readiness of Troops Under Modern Conditions," prepared by two members of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces:

After noting that the "policy of provocation pursued by the US ruling circles has again seriously aggravated the international situation" and that the Soviet Government had therefore instructed the Minister of Defense and the Soviet Army to take all measures to place the Soviet armed forces on highest combat readiness, the article states:

"The experience of history teaches that aggressive countries have often attained significant strategic successes and even victories in war, owing to their having been able to secretly deploy and to put the army and navy in combat readiness for a surprise attack. On the other hand, the underestimation of the timely placement of armed forces in appropriate combat readiness in the face of a military threat has often been one of the reasons for defeat of particular countries....

"The failures of our Army in the initial phase of the Great Patriotic War are also largely explained by the underestimation of the timely placement of troops in increased combat readiness.... Even the substantial shortcomings then existing in the organization, armament, and combat training of the Red Army might not have had decisive influence on the state of defense if the troops had been deployed in time and prepared to repel the German fascist attack. But owing to Stalin and certain other former military leaders, the Soviet troops did not receive orders on the advance deployment of forces and the occupation of defensive positions along the western border of the USSR.

"Thus, history teaches that the aggressor always counts on surprise in an attack, the effectiveness of which is all the higher, the lower the combat readiness of the armies of the states subjected to attack.

"Our people...in the face of military danger, cannot allow the country to be less prepared for conducting a victorious war in defense of its freedom and independence than the imperialist aggressors are prepared for an aggressive war."

The article then notes that the USSR has all the necessary economic and military capabilities to defend the country against aggression and in fact surpasses those who threaten the USSR with war. Soviet troops are required "to be always in high combat readiness and to observe the greatest vigilance." The development of new rocket and nuclear weapons and the threat of an imperialist surprise nuclear-rocket strike against the Soviet Union "places very high and responsible requirements for combat readiness on units and ships and on all our armed forces. Evaluating objectively the power of modern weapons, one must not ignore the great danger which surprise, massive nuclear strikes of an aggressor may represent if the forces and means intended for their prevention or frustration are not kept in constant high combat readiness."

The article notes that in conventional warfare, high combat readiness was required first of all of the forces in the border military districts and the PVO, but that today it is required of all branches of the armed forces, wherever located. "Naturally, the training of the Strategic Rocket Troops for the immediate delivery of a massive, nuclear rocket strike against the aggressor...plays the primary role."

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RED STAR, 5 OCTOBER 1962 (Cont'd)

"The highest combat readiness is that state in which troops are able at any moment to repel successfully a surprise nuclear attack of an aggressor and, at the first signal, to undertake resolute combat operations aimed at the complete destruction of the enemy."

The article then cites the following ingredients of high combat readiness: (1) the modern combat equipment and weapons of the troops; (2) a high level of combat training in all units, including the ability of the troops to carry out operations under conditions of high mobility and maneuverability and the development of an aggressive fighting spirit; (3) efficient and constant supervision of troops under one-man command; (4) perfect condition of all materiel, particularly in the Rocket Troops and the PVO whose troops must always be in such a "degree of combat readiness that they can begin to execute combat missions in a matter of minutes or even seconds after signals and commands are received"; and (5) irreproachable combat discipline on the part of all personnel. (CONFIDENTIAL)

More extensive excerpts of this article are carried in CIA, Foreign Documents Division, "Statements on Soviet Strategic Weapons," #17, 21 March 1963. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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MALINOVSKIY ON COMBAT READINESS, 25 OCTOBER 1962

The following is from the address of Marshal Malinovskiy, Soviet Minister of Defense, to the Armed Forces Ideological Conference, October 1962, as published in Red Star of 25 October 1962:

After noting the military hysteria of the imperialists over Soviet military aid to Cuba and the advances in Soviet weaponry and doctrine, he states that "these factors in themselves are worthless without men who have mastered and are able to put them into action in the interests of gaining victory over the enemy." Whereas previously to attain victory it was necessary to expend efforts, in production and training of cadres, gradually and during the process of a prolonged war, now "decisive results can be achieved even in the initial phase of war. . . . Most of the effort which the country and the Army expended previously to conquer the enemy, over a course of a number of years, now must be incorporated in the first nuclear rocket strike and the subsequent combined operations of all branches of the armed forces."

The Soviet armed forces are called upon to be in constant high combat readiness. "But a situation can develop in the world which requires special vigilance and readiness on the part of our troops. We now are undergoing a period of sharp deterioration in the international situation, when the danger of aggressive operations on the part of US imperialists and their bloc allies is increasing. . . .

"Under these conditions, the party Central Committee and the Soviet Government require us to be in a state of the highest combat readiness. To solve this central problem, all our means, including ideological and educational work and our oral and printed propaganda, must be used.

"What does it mean to be in a state of the highest combat readiness? In a word, this means that all the might of our armed forces, at the first signal, must be put into immediate action against the enemy, his strategic military, economic and political centers and main concentrations of forces.

"Maintenance of the highest combat readiness for a long time is not an easy task. . . . We must well understand the lessons of the initial phase of the last war and educate our servicemen in the spirit of high vigilance, comportment, solidarity and organization. This is particularly important under conditions when the highest combat readiness is required of us.

"In maintaining high combat readiness to the maximum degree, the role of soldiers, officers and generals of the main branch of the armed forces, the Strategic Rocket Troops, is extraordinarily great. They are required to maintain their powerful equipment, as they say, on alert, and to be ready within a short time to deliver crushing retaliatory blows against the most important enemy targets located at any point on earth."

(CONFIDENTIAL)

KHRUSHCHEV ON WAR AND THE CUBAN CRISIS, 12 DECEMBER 1962

Khrushchev devoted the major portion of his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 12 December 1962 to a discussion of the necessity of avoiding nuclear war and to a defense of Soviet policy in the Cuban situation. "The main result of the foreign political activity of the Soviet Government... consists in the fact that the attack on Cuba prepared by the aggressive imperialist circles of the United States has been averted." He repeatedly stated that peaceful coexistence rather than war must be the course for humanity and emphasized the catastrophic consequences of war. Specifically, with regard to the Cuban crisis he stated:

Cuba had been in danger of another invasion this autumn; "everything showed that the US was preparing to carry out an attack on the Cuban Republic using its own armed forces."

Because of these threats, Cuba "last summer" asked the Soviet Government for additional assistance and "an agreement was reached about a number of new measures, including the stationing in Cuba of a few dozen Soviet ballistic rockets of medium range. These weapons were to be in the hands of the Soviet military."

This small number of rockets was not intended for an attack on the US but only for the defense of Cuba. Rockets were placed there so that the American imperialists, if they decided on invasion, would feel that war was on their own frontier and would have a more realistic idea of the danger of thermonuclear war. If there had been no threat of invasion in the first place, there would have been no need to put rockets in Cuba. Not only were the rockets not for attack on the US, the Soviet Union has absolutely no need for military bases on others' territory. Cuba "has no strategic significance for the defense of the Soviet Union. We stationed rockets on Cuba only for the defense of the Cuban Revolution and not for attack on the United States."

"If we wanted to start a war against the United States, we would not have agreed to dismantle the rockets installed in Cuba, which were ready for launching, for battle; we would have put them in motion."

The course of events in the Caribbean confirmed that the threat of US aggression was at hand. Khrushchev here reviewed the buildup of US troops in Guantanamo and the southeastern United States, using press figures of 100,000 men detailed for the attack, 183 ships, etc. He stated that the US brought into full military preparedness all its armed forces, including those in Europe and the Far East, and that "about 20 percent" of the aircraft of SAC were in the air round the clock, carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs aboard. NATO forces were also brought to full battle preparedness. "The world came under the threat of a thermonuclear war."

In the face of these preparations, the Soviet Government "instructed the Minister of Defense to bring the whole army, and first of all the Soviet rocket forces of intercontinental and strategic type, the country's antiaircraft rocket defense and fighter aircraft, into a state of full battle readiness. Strategic aircraft, the navy and our submarine fleet, including atomic submarines, took up prescribed positions. A state of increased military alert was declared in land forces, and demobilization of the senior age groups of the army was suspended in the strategic rocket forces, in the AA defense units and in the submarine fleet. The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, too, were brought up to full battle readiness." If either side had not shown restraint in these circumstances,

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

KHRUSHCHEV ON WAR AND THE CUBAN CRISIS, 12 DECEMBER 1962 (Cont'd)

Khrushchev then described the measures taken beginning 23 October by the Soviet Union to bring about a peaceful settlement. However, the US continued preparations to carry out an attack on Cuba. "In the morning of 27 October we received information from our Cuban comrades and from other sources which directly stated that this attack would be carried out within the next two or three days." Immediate action was needed to preserve peace, and a message was therefore sent to the US President suggesting mutually acceptable solutions--that the US agree not to invade and call off the blockade and that the Soviet Union would then be ready to remove weapons described by the US as "offensive."

Khrushchev further stated that the Soviet personnel which served the rocket installations also left Cuba, that the IL-28s were obsolete and had been sent to Cuba only for use as a kind "of flying artillery" for coastal defense, that the Soviet military measures were revoked in response to the US lifting of the blockade and recall of warships and troops from the area. Favorable preliminary conditions have thus now been created for the elimination of the crisis, though the negotiations must be completed. "Who has won? It can be said that it is reason that won; the cause of peace and people's security has won." Cuba exists and grows stronger. If the Soviet Union was forced, as some say, to give in on something, the US was also forced to give in.

He stated that the Soviet Union fully supported Castro's five points, would never leave Cuba in trouble and that Cuba would not be left defenseless. A fresh invasion of Cuba remains possible; war was prevented in this case by a sensible compromise "but the world was literally on the very brink of...war, and if the imperialists again tighten the knot, will it be possible even to slacken it? One cannot swear to it."

Khrushchev maintained that Soviet men in Cuba had received orders to defend Cuba against invasion, to fight together with the Cubans. The US "understood that if its forces had sparked off the fire of war in Cuba and both Cuban and Soviet people in Cuba were burned in that fire, then no force could have restrained the Soviet Union from delivering a crushing retaliatory blow."

For Adenauer's benefit he stated that the rockets withdrawn from Cuba had been added to the "defense equipment which covers our western borders." (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

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18 June 1963

THE SOVIET BLOC ARMED FORCES
AND THE CUBAN CRISIS
A CHRONOLOGY: JULY - NOVEMBER 1962

NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER
Washington, D. C.

Approved for Release
Date 15 FEB 1985

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (12)

[REDACTED]

Mid-Sep: Various reports and Soviet statements continued to point to Bloc plans to resume moves toward a Berlin settlement in November.

[REDACTED]

15-25 Sep: East German troops were extensively engaged in harvest activity.

16 Sep: A page one story in Red Star described preparations in a PVO rocket unit prior to going on combat duty, tying these to "US provocations against Cuba" and the highest combat readiness. A joint Soviet-Cuban meeting was held in Odessa, according to a Pravda item of the following day.

17 Sep: Khrushchev took a belligerent line in talks with the Austrian Vice Chancellor, stating that the USSR would use submarines and rockets to enforce its right of passage to Cuba and hinting that US intervention in Cuba would spark Soviet reaction in Berlin. He indicated he was still thinking of going to New York in the second half of November and would hope to see the President. If there were no results from these contacts, the Soviets would proceed with the peace

SEPTEMBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (16)

- 25 Sep: A Soviet lecturer at a public forum in Moscow emphasized that the USSR was making every effort to achieve a peaceful solution of the Berlin problem, but Khrushchev cannot wait much longer. A peace treaty is ready and can be signed within minutes but a negotiated settlement is preferable. He then frankly described the horrors of nuclear war, warning that events in Berlin could spark such a conflict; the Soviets would win but only at a terrible cost.
- 25 Sep: Red Star carried a report from the North Caucasus Military District concerning "intensive night flights," some of them of long-range. Over 2,000 letters were said to have been received during one week testifying to the efforts of military personnel to bring their units to the highest state of combat readiness.
- 25-26 Sep: Soviet fighters harassed a USAF C-47, an Air France Caravelle, and a Pan American clipper in the Berlin corridors with close passes; this followed a period of relatively few air incidents.
- 26 Sep: Khrushchev arrived in Ashkhabad, Turkestan, on the start of a tour of Central Asia.
- 27 Sep: Red Star carried an editorial on "training alert" which stressed the importance of efficiently conducted training alerts "to every unit and ship of the Soviet armed forces" as a means of developing their ability to mount instantaneous action. An article described the high state of training and vigilance of a tank unit of SCG.

1-14 OCTOBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS

- 2 Oct: Red Star continued the publication of letters from its readers on the readiness of units and ships in light of the world situation, with an introduction claiming that the US had created a situation in which some incident could "develop into the catastrophe of world thermonuclear war." It reiterated that everything was being done to fulfill the government's requirement that the armed forces be brought to the highest state of combat readiness. An alleged letter said that personnel of an interception unit were always on the alert and ready and that "weapons must always be ready for battle, and doubly so in these days."
- 2 Oct: A Yugoslav official reported he was "about 95 percent sure" that Khrushchev would attend the UN General Assembly in about three weeks.
- 3 and 4 Oct: TASS carried warnings concerning Soviet military retaliatory capabilities in case the US should resort to war over a German peace treaty. Two Soviet officials at the UN indicated on 3 October that the Berlin problem would be solved one way or another by the end of the year.
- 3 Oct: The newly arrived Soviet Ambassador in the Congo reportedly offered military assistance against Katanga if the UN plan failed and the UN was removed from the Congo.
- 3-5 Oct: The East German Party Central Committee held a plenum and announced that the Party Congress would be held in January.
- 3-5 Oct: The East German railways reportedly conducted a communications exercise or CPX involving mobilization procedures (West German report).
- 4 Oct: Soviet President Brezhnev concluded a ten-day visit to Yugoslavia and a communique was issued asserting an identity of views on international questions.

[REDACTED]

1-14 OCTOBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (4)

11 Oct: Red Star announced that the closed area in the Barents and Kara Seas for joint exercises would be extended until 10 November.

12 Oct: Red Star reported that "intense combat training" was in progress in the Army and Navy and that military personnel were increasing their combat readiness which "now has to be maintained on the highest level."

13 Oct: Red Star stated that the recent Pact exercises have shown that the defense potential of the socialist states is adequate and that the joint armed forces are "ready to strike a retaliatory blow at the aggressor at any minute"; another article concerning the newly drafted class of 1943 said that peace is threatened and all Soviet soldiers are in a state of highest combat readiness.

[REDACTED]

15-21 OCTOBER 1962: SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (5)

#335

[REDACTED]

27 Oct 62 - 2

CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS (2)

The US warned that "counteraction" would be taken against any interference with air surveillance of Cuba (press).

PI showed that the construction of MRBM and IRBM sites was continuing and provided additional evidence that each was to have a nuclear storage bunker. The assembly of IL-28s was also continuing.

#335

[REDACTED]

27 Oct 62 - 4

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - SATELLITES

#335

[REDACTED]

29 Oct 62 - 3

BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS - SATELLITES

[REDACTED]

East German security personnel are believed to have undertaken a practice alert at the Marienborn checkpoint on the autobahn; no Allied traffic was affected.

In Bulgaria, AA guns were observed in prepared positions at three airfields, apparently moved from casernes at night; an Aira report made reference to some major movements occurring the night of 29-30 October but these were never confirmed. Otherwise, observations continued to indicate most garrisons full and little movement was seen on roads.

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